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The following is a transcript of remarks made at the Business
Roundtable/Emory University Law and Economics Center Conference on Remedies Under the ALI Propogals held at the Marriott
Hotel in New Orleans, Louisiana, on May 2-5, 1985. The transcript
has been heavily edited stylistically and organizationally to present
these remarks in a more readable form.
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Law
I
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR RULES LIMITING
DIRECTORS' LIABILITY

Our paper attempts to analyze various doctrines in corporate law in light of some of the criticisms of those doctrines that
have been made for a long time. Most of the doctrines, as well as the
criticisms, relate to various restrictions on the ability of shareholders
to sue directors.
Directors are not liable for negligence. Many other people in
contractual or tort relationships can be sued for negligent-like behavior. Frequently, highly self-interested action is also not subject
to suit. For example, it is hard to think of a more self-interested
decision than the amount of compensation you pay yourself, which
all corporate statutes give directors the power to decide. Historically, to the best of my knowledge in the context of publicly-held
corporations, there have been no more than a trivial number of successful suits against directors of publicly-held corporations challenging the amount of compensation that they have decided to pay
themselves.
In addition to the substantive limitations on the ability of shareholders to sue, there are also procedural limitations, many of which
deal with the derivative suit. Of special importance lately has been
the role of so-called special litigation committees. Special litigation
committees are appointed by directors who have been named as defendants in suits. The task of the special litigation committee is to
determine whether a suit brought against the directors is in the best
interests of the corporation or not. The common outcome is that
special litigation committees determine that the suit is not in the
best interests of the corporation and therefore should be dismissed.
Depending on what jurisdiction you are in, that recommendation
will be given deference ranging from complete to almost none.
Our paper was intended to see whether this package of doctrines which limit the legal liability of directors had an economic
rationale. We wanted to focus somewhat on the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project because that, in a sense, emFISCHEL:
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bodies many of the proposals for reform that have been made over
the past few years to strengthen the role of legal constraints on corporate behavior.
We thought it useful to do something which, to the best of my
knowledge, has not been done in the previous literature, and that is
to analyze the nature of liability rules in the corporate context in
relation to an emerging literature on how different types of contracts are enforced. For some types of contracts, resort to the courts
to ensure contractual performance is an essential governance mechanism. Other types of contracts tend to be more self-enforcing.
Parties devise alternate ways of enforcement because the costs of
having legal rules as the primary method of enforcement relative to
other methods of ensuring enforcement are too high. In noncontractual situations, primarily involving government officials, there
are also doctrines limiting the scope of liability, and there has been
some discussion of what is the economic rationale of limitations of
liability in that context as well.
We found that for a variety of reasons many of the characteristics that have been identified with contracts where third parties,
such as the court, only play a relatively minor role in assuring contractual performance are also present in the context of publicly held
corporations. We also discussed some of the special problems that
exist when the party doing the enforcing has a very small or, in
many cases, virtually nonexistent stake in the firm. So there is a
logic in terms of this package of doctrines in the corporate law of
limiting the ability of shareholders, particularly shareholders with a
small stake in the venture, to sue corporate managers, and these
restrictions on liability may very well have a distinct economic
rationale.
I believe what Messrs. Fischel and Bradley are doing is
urging the end of liability rules and derivative suits although by
means they don't explain. Since the most that can be said against
these rules is that they often have high costs and are not as effective
as one would hope, and perhaps not as effective as other monitoring
devices, the conclusion that would be appropriate from that is that
we ought not to overvalue their significance, we ought not to abandon other methods of monitoring, and we certainly should not believe that there is no longer a need for a thriving market for control
because there are derivative suits to monitor management. The correct perception is that derivative suits, liability rules, and tender offers all contribute to reducing agency costs.
SCHWARTZ:

We are in perfect agreement that many monitoring devices exist and there is no reason that some have to continue or

.FISCHEL:
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some have to be eliminated. Our point was that given the economics of liability rules in contractual settings, certain attributes of publicly held corporations, namely efficient information markets, and
the other things we talked about, we are not surprised by existing
rules which, as a package, make it harder to sue directors and hold
them personally liable than it is to sue other people in other contexts. The differences between corporate law and other types of law
are well rooted in fundamental economic principles. The widespread perception shared by many in the ALI project and elsewhere
that the relative unimportance of liability rules in the corporate context is a problem is, at the very least, not an obvious position and,
on balance, is probably an incorrect position.
ScoTt: The normative implication of your paper is that the status
quo is optimal, that there is no reason to change from it. Correct?
FIsCHEL: No reason has been demonstrated.

situation, as I did about the ALI
proposal against mergers and acquisitions. There is an issue of what
is broken that needs to be fixed. Comments were made about the
ravages in the market for corporate control and all of the abuses,
but there has been no articulation of the problems at hand. The
ALI proposal on derivative stockholders' suits, I think, is even less
articulated. There's a notion that we want to strengthen the rules
on duty of care and duty of loyalty to make them much more effective. What we are arguing in this paper is that in the absence of any
egregious problems or issues that we are unable to find, we would
maintain the status quo. We are willing to be convinced, or at least
influenced, by evidence that would argue for change, but we are unconvinced right now.
BRADLEY: I feel somewhat, in this

Status quo is a little bit of a misleading term, because we
are not suggesting that firms be precluded from changing their set
of contracts that they have now or that different jurisdictions evolve
different rules over time. That process seems to have worked reasonably well. There is no evidence that we can identify that the
problem alleged by people who want to strengthen liability rules is
in fact a problem. The evidence, if you wanted to weigh it, would
probably be to the contrary, that there are good reasons why liability rules are less important in a corporate context than in other contexts. Therefore, in this aspect of the ALI project as in, for that
matter, all other aspects of the ALI project, we see no purpose in
codifying a set of rules in response to a nonproblem.
FISCHEL:

GOETZ:

If you put the null hypothesis that these liability rules ought
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to be rejected and done away with, then I would reject that one and
say not proven. But I'd also reject the contrary one which is that
they are really wonderful things. I think that's equally unproven.
Fischel and Bradley really address that question and confront us
with it.
II
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DERIVATIVE Surrs

A.

Deterrent Value of Derivative Suits

I don't recall finding any treatment in the Fischel-Bradley
paper of the other side of the question-the pay-off from behaving
against shareholder interest. The potential profit from misbehaving
may be much larger in the case of corporate management than it is
in the case of a doctor, which might imply that you still need lots of
avenues of protection. Because a doctor fouls up on an operation,
he can't walk away with $50 million to Brazil.
DEMSETZ:

ScoTT: The loyalty cause of action is simply one piece of an extremely complex structure of incentives that bear on management of
a publicly-held corporation, but it can be useful. The question is,
"What is the alternative?" One alternative that Dan and Mike advocate would be to leave it solely to market sanctions. One market
sanction would be that of the capital market. Takeovers are, I think,
a rather inefficient way to limit management quasi-theft. They deal
with a broader issue, the overall performance of the management of
the company, and they are more costly to undertake than a derivative suit. With the fate of takeovers currently in some doubt, I think
they are becoming even less of an answer. The labor market is another response to which Dan points. It seems to me that salary reassessments in the managerial futures market have rather weak
implications for executives at the end of their careers, which includes most of the people running the publicly held corporations.
There are theoretical responses to that kind of a problem, like bonding and so on. I don't observe their taking place to any significant
degree.
The main point is, I don't see that these mechanisms are mutually exclusive. I don't see any reason why you go down a list and say
this is more important and this less, and then take everything at the
bottom of the list and say let's throw it out, let's automatically discard it. Loyalty violations are often secret and concealed as much as
possible, and one of the benefits of the loyalty derivative suit is that
it provides incentives for discovery by the plaintiff's attorney and
recapture. That tends to push management toward overt compen-
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sation, and on overt compensation the other market mechanisms, it
seems to me, can more effectively function.
SCHWARTZ:

The market for control can be skewed without judicial

intervention. I agree that the suits have not always, or even generally, responded very well to the problems that are created by managers who try to create impediments to take-overs and proxy fights
and the like, but I just think that we would be worse off without
liability rules and enforcement. I also think that the information
markets, which it is contended serve us well here, don't function
adequately to monitor. We are talking about transactions which basically are not revealed, indeed have further been concealed, and
one needs bloodhounds with proper incentives to ferret out those
deeds. Although the transactions are not material on a stand-alone
basis, ignoring them can undermine management's dedication to
the corporation. Moreover, much of the litigation involves corporations to whom the market is not nearly so efficient. Not even the
semi-strong version of the efficient market theory would be applicable because many of them are companies that are not widely followed. I think a case is made in the ALI documents for the value of
shareholder litigation. Potentially valid suits can be nipped in the
bud by the defendant's action themselves through the special litigation committee.
There may be frivolous suits being brought. That is a very
costly experience for corporations and there ought to be some way
of more effectively monitoring that sort of thing. The plaintiffs' lawyers, who make the thing work, have to be subjected to a closer scrutiny and, perhaps, discipline, than they now are. Those are pretty
serious failings in the operation of derivative suit mechanisms, and
it is useful to try to address them by a set of rules.
I think that the case is not concluded by Michael and Dan's argument that the existing set of rules have an economic rationality
and that therefore we ought not to try to change the results.
B.

The Costs of Derivative Suits
1. Managers as Inefficient Risk Bearers

MANNE: The point is made frequently in various contexts that if you
have such a rule, there is a danger that you will do more harm than
good. You do good by punishing people for their mistakes, but you
also do harm by preventing them from taking any risk. We know
from other literature that there is a considerable problem in the corporation of coordinating the shareholders' preference for risk with
the general risk averseness of managers. It seems to me that that
ought to be examined precisely in this context.

364
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MACEY: One negative aspect of imposing liability rules is that man-

agers are particularly ill-equipped to handle firm-specific risk. That
is, managers can't really diversify and, to that extent, if we impose
liability rules for, say, negligent conduct on them which they can't
diversify away, and don't allow them to contract around them, it's an
inefficient thing to do. To the exent that they can insure themselves
they will, but if they can't they are not particularly efficient risk
bearers.
FISCHEL: I don't think that is right. The fact that managers are inef-

ficent risk bearers means that there is a cost associated with making
them bear risk. It doesn't mean that it's inefficient to make them
bear risk.
MACEY: If you've got a choice between having the risk of managers'

negligent behavior fall on the shareholders who can diversify that
away or fall on the manager who can't, and the shareholders can
bear the risk in a much less costly way, then given the ability to contract in that regard, it seems to me that they will. To the extent they
can't, it's inefficient. There is a relationship between the increased
cost that you talk about and the efficiency aspect.
2.

The Role of the BusinessJudgment Rule

SCHWARTZ: The Fischel-Bradley paper misstates the problem and

the likely reaction of courts to risk taking. It suggests that the courts
tend to punish those who are the cause of those bad decisions and
I
that simply is not the case.
Obviously, we don't want to make managers so gun-shy to take
risks that it disserves the interest of investors. The way the law has
tried to accommodate that is through the business judgment rule,
which is almost at the centerpiece of the principles that govern the
conduct of corporate managers. That rule makes judgment decisions that have been made by directors virtually immune from liability. In other words, I don't think bad results produce litigation.
Dan and Mike don't think that they should, I don't think that they
should. Moreover, I don't think there is anything in the ALI documents, certainly in TD 3 or TD 4, which has just been published,
which in any significant way diminishes the protection of the business judgment rule.
MANNE: The ALI "rational basis" test is a tightening up of the stan-

dards that directors have to meet when confronted with a charge of
breach of duty. How much in terms of lost risk-taking is that one
word going to cost shareholders in America? That's the question.
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Henry, I don't think the formulation of the rule you find
in the ALI's draft in § 4.01 is different from existing law. I can
show you numerous Delaware decisions that precede the draft of
§ 4.01 that expressed the business judgment rule in those words, or
sometimes in words that seem to impose a higher standard on directors. It's a question of what you mean by having a rational basis and
how you try to illustrate that. The ALI has sought to illustrate it, I
think, by examples that show that it does not impose a very exacting
standard on directors. It's not even that the directors have to stand
a test that what they did was reasonable, but just that they had to
"rationally believe" that what they were doing was acting in the best
interests of the corporation. That's essentially the test as it is contained in the latest draft of the ALI provision that was circulated a
couple of weeks ago.
SCHWARTZ:

ScoTT: Has there been any change in the investigation and inquiry
predicate for that belief? That was the part that troubled me in the
former draft.
The first version, which goes back to about 1982, insisted upon a duty of inquiry on the part of the directors. Now, the
director has to be satisfied that the inquiry that he has made, or the
information that he possesses, is sufficient, but it doesn't require,
necessarily, a separate undertaking to investigate. An example of
the way that would be applied is the recent Delaware decision in
Smith v. Van Gorkom' which involved a shareholder suit based upon a
merger of Transunion Corporation with one of the Pritzker corporations, in which the Delaware court seemed to fault these directors
for not having made sufficient inquiry. I believe that under the ALI
formulation Van Gorkom comes out the other way, because I think
that you don't need to have a separate inquiry on the part of directors who are as well informed and as experienced with respect to the
affairs of the company as that board was. If you were presenting to a
board that didn't have that kind of experience, some kind of an inquiry would be appropriate. But the predicate for the application of
the business judgment rule is that the board believe that it's informed rather than that it undertook a separate inquiry.
SCHWARTZ:

It's ironic that you say Van Gorkom might have gone differently under the ALI formulation, since many people believe that
that case is actually a response from Delaware to the kind of criticism implicit in the ALI proposal.
MANNE:

1

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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I've never made a count of how many times the phrase "rational basis," "reasonable basis," or "inquiry" appeared in the opinion, although I am tempted to do so. At the very least it indicates
that the ALI draft is vague and perhaps misleading. I think that the
court was making an honest effort to apply what they believed the
proposals to be and perhaps one might advocate that the case at
least deserves some mention in the ALI proposal in order to distinguish how the case should come out under its rule.
MACEY:

Most lawyers in the room found the Van Gorkom case a real
shock, where the rational basis test was applied with a mechanical
vengence. The Van Gorkom case was one where good results produced litigation, which is about as perverse a result as I know of. It
involved the sale of the firm at a major premium, which I think was
40% over the market. Some shareholder, after the fact, thought
perhaps there was more to be gotten, and decided to bring litigation
to see if he couldn't personally get something more and restructure
the bargain. This is the trouble with moving into uncharted waters,
whether it's a rational basis test or language like that, that implies
the same notion of some kind of bureaucratic procedure.
CARNEY:

Bill, the issue was not whether that transaction was rationally based, but rather whether there was adequate inquiry. The
rational basis test is not at all in issue in Van Gorkom, but just
whether they followed the right procedures in dealing with the
transaction. Insofar as being able to recover anything, that hasn't
even been decided. Now the case has to go below, to the Court of
Chancery, where the plaintiff has to prove that they suffered damage
from that transaction, which is pretty dubious. Rational basis is simply not the issue in the case.
SCHWARTZ:

Except the two converge. At some point, an implicit decision to adopt a practice or procedure, as in this case rubber stamping everything the CEO did, becomes a kind of substantive decision.
You can say it's process, but it doesn't look too different, when you
read that whole case, from the way the same court might talk about a
charge that they didn't get enough money in the sale.
MANNE:

If we didn't have a rational basis test at all in the statute
or in the standard the court was following you'd still have gone
through the same analysis. Therefore, rational basis doesn't contribute to the problem in this case.
SCHWARTZ:

I quote (from the opinion):
"Indeed, the record compels the conclusion that the directors had
no rational basis for expecting that a market test was attainable,

CARNEY:
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given the terms of the Agreement as executed during the evening
of September 20."12
FISCHEL: The Van Gorkom case illustrates the danger of strategic behavior by minorities of trying to disrupt transactions which are obviously beneficial to shareholders as a class. It also demonstrates the
related point, how doctrines which sound very good-you should
only make a decision when you are informed, which is innocuous in
itself-can be completely perverted by a plaintiff's attorney and a
judge to reach an outrageous result. Those dangers are not confined to derivative suits. In all kinds of other suits you have this
problem of a real risk. of strategic behavior of somebody who can
make an argument which is wealth increasing from a private point of
view, but is quite costly to the supposed beneficiary, whether it's
consumers or shareholders.
Scoar: Just an addendum on the Van Gorkom case. There's a kind of
irony in it, because the petard on which Van Gorkom is hoist is the
Wall Street investment banking version of the world in which firms'
inherent or intrinsic value is not to be found reliably indicated in the
market price. That's the underlying, and faulty, premise. I don't
even have to get to the problem of whether they applied the right
rule.
There have been a number of remarks made that suggest
that Van Gorkom is a typical "strike suit." It's at least worth noting
that the plaintiffs involved and their families owned something in
excess of $2 million worth of stock. So, I don't think that's a fair
critique of this plaintiff in this situation in terms of a typical "strike
suit" plaintiff. Aside from that, I really think the characterization of
the case as one that appears to track at least the previous version of
the ALI project is an accurate one. Indeed, it seems to me that
whether it was the intent of the court or not, one could not think of
a more devastating critique of the previous version of § 4.01 of the
ALI project than what the Delaware Supreme Court did by handing
down Smith v. Van Gorkom, in terms of the process oriented approach
that the ALI was recommending and the kind of silly results it's
likely to lead to.
WEISs:

C.

Distinguishing the Duties of Care and Loyalty

I believe that the objections that Dan and Michael have
leveled against derivative suits are premised on a model that costly
decisions or shirking are the kinds of law suits that contain
problems. But the real problems addressed by derivative suits are
SCHWARTZ:

2

488 A.2d at 878.
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self-dealing transactions. Dan points out that not every self-dealing
transaction is subjected to close analysis by directors or courts. The
compensation agreement is the essence of a self-dealing transaction
and yet we permit those kinds of transactions to go ahead. But
there is a rule of necessity that operates here. Compensation is not
a discretionary transaction in the sense that a corporation has to
enter into some kind of compensation agreement with management.
How else is it going to do it? While breaches of duty and breaches
of loyalty can each cause harm, as the paper points out, there is not
an equal temptation on the part of managers to shirk as there is to
self-deal. Shirking can provide some more leisure to enjoy oneself,
but self-dealing can lead to great riches. Therefore, the self-dealing
transactions are in far greater need of policing than any other.
Although I don't agree with the conclusion that therefore we could
totally eliminate law suits based on the breach of the duty of care, I
don't see that as a great tragedy if that were to occur either. It's not
nearly as important as suits for the breaches of the duty of loyalty.
The traditional discussion of the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty in the legal literature is along the following lines: The
duty of care involves situations where management makes business
decisions without any conflict of interest, so therefore you need one
set of legal rules for that, whereas the duty of loyalty involves conflicts of interest so you need another set of legal rules for that.
Commentators have frequently echoed the same theme. That distinction in economic terms is a very strained one at best, because it
is extremely misleading to talk about conflicts of interest as only
paying yourself an above market rate of compensation. There are
many other types of conflicts of interest which result from not being
able to get all the benefits of good actions and not having to bear all
the costs of bad actions. We talk about a few of them-consuming
excess leisure, not concentrating hard. The various permutations
are infinite. A conflict of interest is always present. Duties of care
and of loyalty are simply different manifestations of the inherent
conflict of interest in an agency relationship. Building on that, we
do not see any basis for having a completely different set of legal
rules based on whether the suit can be characterized as one or the
other, because the nature of the characterization is extremely
artificial.
Some of the differences that have been suggested relate to the
amount of the gains that one can get from a large one-shot fraud
versus simply not showing up for meetings over a long period of
time. That is, for the most part, a fair point, although if somehow
you could measure the cumulative deviation from performance
which would maximize investors' wealth, it's not obvious to me,
FISCHEL:
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apart from this point about one shot fraud, that investors are properly more concerned about what I would consider to be highly visible forms of misconduct, rather than what is extremely difficult to
monitor, the lack of diligence or effort, or whatever.
I think that Dan and Mike are correct. In a conceptual
sense there really isn't much difference between duty of care and
duty of loyalty in respect to who benefits and who is harmed.
On the other hand, the fact that these are conceptually the same
does not mean that they are detectable in the same way. If you consider all situations in which the management of the corporation
might benefit at the expense of shareholders, some may involve evidence that is much more suitable to adjudication in courts than
others. The cases that come up under the classification of "duty of
loyalty" are precisely those in which the nature of evidence required
to find someone innocent or guilty is such that it is suitable for presentation in court. The cases that come up as business judgment
cases are precisely those in which the evidence is not suitable. The
argument favoring the derivative suit is stronger in those cases in
which the evidence is suitable for presentation in court.
DEMSETZ:

I think it's clear, at the very least, you have a continuum.
As you toughen the duty of care you inevitably, by any definition,
move into the duty of loyalty area. The concept of fairness is very
similar to a toughened duty of care. As you pay greater and greater
attention to concepts like rational decision you move more and
more into some "objective" truth that the directors fail to meet.
WOLFSON:

GOETZ: My position on the care/loyalty distinction is similar to Harold's, but we differ slightly. I agree that Dan and Mike are plainly
correct at a conceptual level, but I am a little bit more agnostic at
the practical level. I will put my position a little bit stronger now
than I did in the paper. It seems to me a good thing for the law to
create a kind of legal lexicon, to place labels on compartments of
behavior, and then to see whether anybody finds those labels useful.
I thought, although I don't have great familiarity with corporate law,
that probably the distinction between loyalty and duty means something to people and can be drawn in a way that people know
whether one duty is being violated rather than the other. If there
are then practical considerations that might dictate the advisability
of different treatment of those compartments of behavior, then I
think it is fine to be allowed to treat them differently.
Scorr: Having the courts try to monitor and sanction violations of
some sort of care standard is simply not pragmatically successful
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and desirable. Sure, the care and loyalty categories at some high
level of conceptual abstraction are all indistinguishable. They are all
examples of agency costs. Nonetheless, the question is whether, operationally, there are some useful distinctions to be made here.
I think it would be an important clarification of the law and
legal thinking to abolish care liability. I don't think that it would be
an important change in outcome, because the actual imposition of
care liability is a rare event. There are a great many ways of blocking the outcome of imposing liability for short-comings in performance. There are substantive rules like the business judgment rule;
procedural rules like all the obstacles to the derivative suit, and deterrent-removal devices such as liability indemnification and insurance. But in the process of blocking care liability through all these
different ways, it seems to me that there is a lot of doctrinal damage
and confusion engendered, and I think it would be preferable,
therefore, to choose outright abolition.
All of the reasons for rejecting care liability, on which I am in
accord with Dan and Mike, it seems to me in large part do not apply
to loyalty liability. The point isn't that loyalty liability or loyalty
rules are a more important form of monitoring than monitoring of
care. In terms of actual consequences for the operation of the economic system, it seems to me that in some large sense the care with
which management performs its job is several orders of magnitude
more important than loyalty derelictions. But that is not a reason
for not employing a tool that is useful, even if it is a tool that is of
limited usefulness.
Most, it seems to me, of the Fischel-Bradley arguments and data
apply much more to the case against the care cause of action, and
some of them, indeed, tend to support the loyalty cause of action.
The difficulty of determining the cause, for example, of a business
disaster, and of having a court make that determination, the danger
of making managment too risk-averse in its business decision-making, the use of director and officer liability insurance to contract out
of the liability sanction-all of those apply much more to the care
situation.
The ALI position is that you should try to fine-tune the liability
rules and the derivative suit procedures, make the Special Litigation
Committee a little less of an automatic veto over every derivative
suit, and so on. Is it worth attempting to go that route? I'm inclined
to doubt it. I think the courts would be able to work with and administer more effectively, with fewer error costs, an abolition of care
suits and a simplification of loyalty derivative suits. For me, the bottom line pragmatically comes down in favor of loyalty liability being
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maintained, and indeed somewhat strengthened, because it is a useful function that courts can fairly effectively perform.
People still seem to be tenaciously clinging to the notion
that we really need legal rules in duty of loyalty cases, namely financial conflict of interest cases. Presumably, everybody would admit
the decision of what salary to pay yourself is a conflict of interest
situation, but everybody realizes that legal contraints are relatively
unimportant in that situation. Notwithstanding the absence of a
legal check, directors are very sensitive to this problem, they have
outside experts that they call in, and they are very sensitive to the
competitive wage being paid by other firms. In other words, even in
conflict of interest, or so-called duty of loyalty, situations, there are
good reasons why firms can continue to operate in ways that are not
obviously detrimental to investors without meaningful legal
sanctions.
Another distinction that was offered is the notion of
detectability, that certain things are more obvious and can be seen
more easily. I think that is a correct point but, again, the important
thing to keep in mind is that if it is easier for a court to see that a
transaction is not at arm's length, if that is the example we are using,
then it's also presumably easier for some of the internal monitors
within the firm to see it as well. That is the explanation for the legal
doctrine that disclosure to disinterested directors, again depending
on the jurisdiction that you are in, either eliminates the possibility of
judicial review entirely, or at the very least reduces the level ofjudicial review. There is a recognition that the function played by
courts can also be played by monitors within the corporation and
there is no special expertise of courts here. If anything, the opposite is true. If one wanted to push the point farther, one could say
that the real problem with detectability is primarily duty of care violations, where it's very hard to detect flagging effort or not giving
maximum effort. But we don't have a lot of suits in that area.
FisCHEL:

D.

Evidence of Wealth Effects of Derivative Suits
1. Review of Fischel-Bradley Study

We tried to get the best empirical data that we could to
analyze the claims that investors are made worse off by legal rules
which limit the exposure of directors and, conversely, would be better off if the scope of liability were expanded. We thought, analogously to all of the other studies along this line, that the most direct
method of looking at that would be to analyze stock price returns
rather than the number of suits filed or anything else.
What we initially had in mind was as sophisticated an event
FISCHEL:
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study as we could conduct, taking all of the different events in the
context of a.derivative suit-the filing of the suit on through to the
disposition of the case. In fact, it was impossible to use the customary methodology of performing event studies, because the financial
press did not report any information in connection with these suits.
Initially we were very frustrated, but in talking about it we drew an
inference that if legal proceedings in derivative suits were as important to protecting investors' interests as many of the proponents
claimed, it was anomolous that the financial press which reported
events relating to investors' wealth did not deem these suits significant enough to even have a line about them in the Wall Street
Journal.
Not having any data from the sources that one usually looks at,
we resorted to analyzing judicial decisions that we were able to find
which met the criteria that were necessary, namely that they were
firms that were publicly traded and therefore for which we could get
the relevant stock price data. The results suggest that the wealth
effects of derivative suits, no matter how they're decided, no matter
whether the claim is based on the duty of loyalty or the duty of care,
are, for the most part, relatively unimportant to investors.
These data were gathered from court records and so our
event date is the announcement of the court decision. It's not the
announcement appearing in the financial press or even the popular
press because we couldn't find those. Rather, it was right out of the
Court ruling itself and the date decided was given by that. We are
not saying there is absolutely no effect here. If you look at the signs
of all the point estimates, all the ones where the suits were halted
are negative, and where they were allowed to go through were positive. We report not only point estimates, but also fractions of the
sample positive and negative. By and large, on the "halt's" the
greater fraction is negative, and on the "allowed to proceed's" the
fraction was more positive.
Then the question is statistical significance. By and large, there
are effects here. After all, there is a bag of money being adjudicated; if the suit goes through, the stockholders do run a risk indeed of getting more money, and if it's suspended or halted they
lose that opportunity. But what we see in these data are not huge
valuation effects-far less than I personally, and I think we collectively, would expect, if indeed what was going on here was a fundamental, basic realignment of managers' interests with respect to
those of the stockholders. Although we can see that there are some
effects in these data, which gives us even more confidence that the
data were gathered appropriately and that the analysis went through
reasonably error-free, we don't think that these results are signifiBRADLEY:
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cant and certainly don't indicate a fundamental realignment of interests of managers and stockholders.
2.

Critiques of Study

The data does not prove the point. I doubt the ability
of this kind of an event study to filter the noise and to identify and
explain the reaction to the filing or the dismissal of a lawsuit. Too
many things are going on. Moreover, the particular events that are
being focused on, the filing of the suit and termination or dismissal
of the suit, are ambiguous events. The filing of the lawsuit has significance if the suit has merit and is likely to lead to recovery. But at
the time it's filed, it hasn't been subjected to that kind of analysis.
Similarly, the termination of a suit would have a negative effect on
shareholders, if what was being terminated was a suit that had merit.
But again, it's much too early in the proceeding, in many cases, to
know whether that's the case. Moreover, many of these suits should
not be expected to have a profound impact on the price of the stock
because, on a stand-alone basis, the suit itself tends to be immaterial. Furthermore, the filing of a suit or the dismissal of a suit pertains to an underlying event which has probably been made public
and for which there may well have been an effect in the market price.
Most important, the data fails to measure the deterrent value of derivative suits and of class actions.
SCHWARTZ:

Most of my comments are really about the lack of a theory underlying the statistical study. Finance theory generally has
three potential forces at work in affecting stock prices. One of these
is expected earnings of the stock. The second is the systematic risk
of the stock-that component of the risk of a stock which, because it
is correlated with the market as a whole, prevents risk avoidance
through portfolio diversification. The third is firm-specific risk, risk
that is associated with the performance of a particular company's
stock, but which is not correlated with the market as a whole. People don't get compensated for bearing firm-specific risk because
they can escape the risk by diversifying their portfolios.
If, for one reason or another, it's not so cheap to diversify portfolios, then the problems associated with the derivative suits and the
derivative suits themselves may impinge on the stock prices, or they
may affect stock prices by changing the expectations people have
about future earnings of the stock. If these are the sources of interdependence between derivative suits (and the problems behind
these suits) and stock prices, it seems to me that different statistical
tests should be applied, although I don't think the data are rich
enough to really do this. One ought to assess the degree to which
the event of a derivative suit or the frequency of derivative suits or
DEMSETZ:
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the decisions about derivative suits' impact on expectations about
earnings or impact on expectations about the size of the firm-specific risk associated with owning that particular stock. This would
require looking at whether the frequency of derivative suits for a
particular company has changed from a historic pattern, which
might give rise to a change in expectations either about firm-specific
risk or about expected earnings.
GOETZ: A threshold question of mine was, "What was the magnitude of the effects that we were looking for in the first place?"
After getting over the threshold question of new information
and the magnitude of the effect we were looking for, I then began to
ask myself what effect I would have expected theoretically upon dismissal of one of these suits. My own answer was, "Well, it all depends." In some cases it would make the stock go up and in other
cases down. It depends, for instance, on whether you're talking
about management which has already departed or if the suit has an
impact on future profitability. If I understand the Fischel-Bradley
study correctly, that it averages over the observations, it occurred to
me that perhaps we were seeing positive results cancelling out negative results. There is another conclusion that might be drawn from
their study: What are the results if one ignores algebraic sign, and
simply asks whether something happens when these events occur?
After I reflected properly on how unhappy ajob it is to do empirical research anyway, I invoked the Great Provider of Information
who would come down and settle this question for us. Probably
what Fischel and Bradley would have preferred to find in line with
the tenor of all their theoretical discussion was that a dismissal of a
stockholder's derivative suit would increase stock value, showing
that these suits are not cost effective. However, I wasn't sure what
normative conclusion to draw from that. If you adopt a game strategic approach to this, it is entirely possible that, once a corporate
manager has cheated, the enforcement process at that point is not
cost effective. But that doesn't suggest that the stockholders
wouldn't want to subject management to an effective threat. Dan
and Mike's point about the minority rule and the fringe stockholders
can be turned against them, at least hypothetically, by arguing that
people who are kind of "crazy" arguably serve a useful function.
They present the management group with some finite probability
that somebody out there will sue whether this is cost effective or
not-and that deters the very conduct that stockholders are trying
to regulate in the first place.
ScOm: Charlie Goetz points out that you can construct a rather
plausible game model in which negative abnormal returns to the
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shareholders from bringing a derivative suit are, nonetheless, consistent with the shareholders' best interest ex ante. I would add that
making that model work in a real world would not depend on crazies, or shareholders somehow conspiring together to mount collective credible threats, or anything like that. All it depends on is
rational, self-seeking, plaintiff's attorneys. The plaintiff's attorney,
for exactly the reasons Dan objects to, is concerned with whether he
can make the individual lawsuit pay off for him, not with whether it
has for the firm as a whole and for the shareholders as a whole, an
actual negative effect. So the attorney in the derivative suit is a
splendid solution to your problem of how do you mount a credible
threat or how can you count on there being a crazy out there who
will sacrifice himself for the ex ante good of the others.
Fischel-Bradley actually found that dismissals in derivative suits
are negative events for stockholders, and I would add that they are
more negative in the case of loyalty suits than in the case of care
suits, at least on a repartition of the data that I undertook. On the
first sample you had, when you sent me the printout, I did a loyalty/care breakdown and found that I got essentially the same results although somewhat different magnitudes. The loyalty cases, as
you reported, were negative on dismissal, positive on continuance,
etc. On the care suits, the signs reversed. I found that dismissals
were positive abnormal return events and continuances were negative. Then when I made that same kind of run on your second enlarged sample, the effect didn't completely disappear, but
weakened. What I found was that on the loyalty dismissals, I got a
larger negative abnormal return than for the group as a whole, and
on the care dismissals, I got a smaller one. I also noticed that when
I did this recheck, I didn't come out with characterizations that
matched yours terribly well. There is the question of how you make
that characterization when the lawsuit may contain a number of
counts. In the separation criterion that I used in running that check,
I didn't particularly want to depend on the court's choice to call or
not call something care or loyalty, or happening to use that word in
the text or not use it. What I was really looking for in the opinions
in order to make the characterizations was whether there was some
allegation of a direct monetary benefit obtained by the defendant,
which it was the object of the lawsuit to recover. On that basis I
made the care/loyalty distinction, and I still found this distinction
between care and loyalty, although not as powerfully as on your first
sample where it actually caused the signs to reverse.
I want to express some fairly profound skepticism about
these event studies. We are dealing with very complex events. Even
reasonable lawyers disagree about the impact of the decision on the
CARNEY:
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range of behavior available to management in the future. Certainly
corporate counsel trying to advise their clients about what they can
do are going to go through an awful lot of agonizing and handwringing in the process. To expect the market instantly to be able
to predict the wealth effects of these judicial decisions is a fairly
heroic kind of assumption.
DEMSETZ: I'm not clear, exactly, what your statistics would measure.
Let me give you an example of measuring something different than
what you think they are measuring. Suppose there is a company that
is tied up in litigation on one of these suits. The management is
somehow occupied with this, and the suit gets ended. The stock
price goes up, not because the decision is good or bad, but because
management doesn't need to mess around with this thing anymore
and the uncertainty of it all is eliminated. How do we interpret the
rise in the stock's price?
RIBSTEIN: A follow-up on Bill Carney's point. It's not just the
wealth effects of the decisions that are unknown but on a more basic
level, the precedential value. We argued some time about what the
Van Gorkom case says. Unless you know that, you obviously can't
make any determination about the wealth effect. That's going to be
a problem in any of the event studies that study the effect of the
decision on a range of stocks.

Let me add that if the lower court now comes back with a
no-damage result in the Van Gorkom case, we really are not going to
know what it means. It may be a signal that the case has no precedential value and that this demonstrates second thoughts about it.
Or it may be thought that in the next case you can collect $60
million.
But I want to raise a different kind of issue about this. There
seems to be another problem here that can be related to an ex
post/ex ante distinction. Even when you find the positive financial
result-which is not too surprising whenever the company has a real
probability of collecting a lot of money-you still don't know that
the probability of such suits being won by future plaintiffs may not
reduce the value of all other stocks on the market. And that reduction could vastly outweigh the benefit to the shareholders in this
company. So even if you find a strongly significant positive sign as a
result of these suits being brought and not dismissed, you still don't
know, empirically and as a matter of general welfare economics,
whether the derivative suit is a good idea or not.
MANNE:

GOETZ: The argument could be made that the social value of the
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suit was the addition of the two, without regard to sign, because it's
the price differential that keeps the two kinds of assets in equilibrium that measures its value. I think that Robert Stroh has written
an article which addresses the same point, and I believe came up
with the price differential answer.
I can see that as a way of measuring the value of the rule,
but that's not what we are doing here. Here, you've already got the
rule on the book, ex ante, with the court deciding in the specific case
that it will be applicable. But that affects how everyone else ex ante
sees their stock being valued in the future.
MANNE:

3.

Response to Criticism

Someone mentioned that perhaps what we are seeing
here is a situation in which half of any one particular sample is a
positive result and the other half is a negative result, and what we
are seeing is a washing out of those two effects. I did include a percentage of positives and negatives. If you look at those numbers,
you will see that the positives outweigh the negatives when the point
estimate was positive, and the negatives outweigh the positives
when the point estimate was negative. I can assure you that there is
no one firm driving those results, there is no one firm that stands
out significantly. In fact, you have to get the portfolio diversification
effect before the standard error gets small enough to be significant.
We certainly recognize that derivative stockholder suits fall
within the definition of firm-specific events. But that doesn't say
that they're not going to be priced out in the capital market. Firmspecific events and firm-specific risk will not be priced out ex ante.
Clearly, the argument is that stockholders can well diversify that
type of risk on their own account. But that's not to say that when
such firm specific events happen, there will not be a stock price effect. Clearly, we are not compensated for the risk of fire for most
corporations that we hold, because that is diversifiable risk. However, when a fire does occur, the value of that firm does drop precipitously in the absence of any insurance. A tender offer, on the other
side of the ledger, if you will, is a firm-specific event. That doesn't
mean that when somebody offers a premium of 50 percent of the
share, the stock price isn't going to respond to it. It's just that it's
not priced out ex ante, so it's unexpected. There should be enough
positives to outweigh the negatives. That's the nature of diversification, and that's why it's not compensated ex ante.
The points made by Harold and Don about expectations and
modeling and what you expect going into the data are excellent
points, and it does scream for the absence of a theory as we go into
these data. But at the same time, we do expect that, to the extent
BRADLEY:
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that the derivative suit is a firm-specific event, we should observe
some stock price behavior.
DEMSETZ: A derivative suit will impact stock price only because it
impacts expectations about earnings. If firm-specific risk increases,
say as measured by a greater variance about the same mean expected earnings, stock price should not be impacted if you can diversify out of the risk.
We agree with virtually every criticism of the empirical
work, but I don't think we would, nevertheless, say that it necessarily
could be done any better, and more importantly, that we are not
comfortable with the conclusion that we draw from it. Notwithstanding all these criticisms, we interpret the facts that there is no
public disclosure of events relating to derivative suits and that there
are very small wealth effects associated with derivative suits, no matter how they come out or what theory they are based on, to suggest
that they are not very important to investors. You can quarrel with
what "not very important" means, but nevertheless I think that it is
something that we now know, by virtue of this data, that we didn't
know before the data existed. Notwithstanding all of its infirmities, I
think it does shed light on the ultimate issue being addressed.
Therefore, I think it's a valuable part of the study.
FISCHEL:

I regard Fischel and Bradley as having produced a statistically valid demonstration that the derivative suits do affect these
things. In the t-testing experiment in the beginning of Fisher's design of experiments, he required only four proper signs. They have,
on decision day, six observations with the "right" sign, on decision
day plus one day after, six with the "right" sign, and on decision
week, five with the "right" sign and one "wrong." That impresses
me as a fairly strong significance test. Admittedly, the effect is small,
but it seems to me they have demonstated that the derivative suit is
something that stockholders value but not by very much, perhaps.
TULLOCK:

4.

Comparison with Data on Wealth Effects of Mergers

I heard a lot about how difficult these cases are to evaluate. I think that whenever you work on a problem, it seems that
those problems are worse than the ones everyone else faces.
I don't see in principle how the data are any worse here, or the
expectations problems any greater, than other studies in, for example, the merger area, where, in one case, we're prepared to believe
the numbers out there in the market.
There's a natural tie-in here with mergers because the hardest
thing to come to a conclusion on is the activities of bidding firms.
LEFrTWICH:
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There is a debate about the sign of those gains, if any, and that is
precisely because of the capitalization issue about expectations.
That's a function of whether or not the firm has a reputation for
doing this, what you learn about the management as the whole process unfolds.
There is an analogy with mergers and acquisitions. People familiar with mergers understand that the actual announcement
of the merger typically precedes the consummation by maybe up to
eighteen months in some cases. We are jumping in, knowingly, in
the middle of a phenomenon that we'd like to go back on. Mergers
and tender offers are very complicated things, yet we still expect the
market to sort that out.
BRADLEY:

In terms of Richard's comment about the analogy between
the kind of data presented by Fischel-Bradley and the data on mergers, the Fischel-Bradley data is much more important in my view
than data on mergers. If firms are losing money by making these
bids, then market forces will discipline those firms. In the derivative
suit realm, though, where both the filing of the derivative suit and
the course of the litigation itself are outside of the controls of the
firm, and outside of the control of market forces, the kind of study
that Dan and Mike are doing takes on much greater significance.
MACEY:

About the similarity between this study and the merger
study, the question asked in the merger study was, do stockholders
of the companies involved in the merger or takeover suffer? It
seems that they do not. Certainly, the ones on the target side seem
to benefit, and as to those on the takeover side, there is evidence
that they don't suffer and may even get a benefit. A separate question, though, is, does permitting mergers to occur, as a whole, help
stockholders? In other words, would it be better to have an economy in which mergers were not allowed? Now the difference between that case and the present one is, I have a theory which
suggests that if you didn't let them occur, there would be damage to
stockholders. I have a strong theory on that proposition. That's why
I don't have to go back and make the second attempt. In this case,
we haven't that theory yet.
ALCHIAN:

A merger is a trade, a voluntary transaction. We always
expect there to be gains from trade. I don't need to know much
more than that to expect there will be some positive stock price reevaluations on both sides. When we start talking about derivative
suits, we are no longer talking about voluntary transactions, or exchanges or trades. We can't predict the sign in terms of the outCARNEY:
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come of a particular derivative suit. We get some information. In
some cases it's fairly weak information, and presumably the market
will discount it because of enormous uncertainty about what it
means.
While I agree with Armen that the theory we have about
mergers and the market for corporate control is stronger than the
theory we have in connection with derivative suits, my agreement is
not one hundred percent. There may still be externalities that are
difficult to capture in our measurement because all of the measurement tests,just as in a derivative suit, are addressed just to the effect
on the shareholders of the target company. There may be effects
that we don't understand on all other companies in aggregate as a
result of these events.
MANNE:

5.

The Problem of Timing the Effect on Market Price

Mike mentioned earlier that a study of mergers focusing
on the consummation date of the merger was not significant because
the significant event occurred quite a bit earlier. Therefore, the
consummation was an anti-climax. To some extent, isn't that true
also with the filing of a derivative suit? That is, it's an anti-climax to
an event the underlying facts of which were revealed much earlier.
One example is Texas Gulf Sulphur.3 There were private lawsuits
filed against Texas Gulf Sulphur, class actions as a result of the insider
trading case that the SEC had launched. I would doubt that the filing of the class action suits from Texas Gulf had much of an impact. I
wonder if you don't have to look back at the event when it was first
disclosed to see what the anticipated market reaction was, rather
than to look at the anti-climatic event, which may have the same kind
of relevance as the merger consummation date or the actual announcement of the merger.
For example, Bhopal is a significant event. When Melvin Belli
files a lawsuit against Union Carbide, that event, I would think, has
been fully reflected in the market price.
SCHWARTZ:

Scorr: I think Bhopal is exactly the wrong illustration. In Bhopal,
the event signals a loss to the corporation. The lawsuit merely confirms that that process is taking place.
What you are talking about here, at least in many instances,
would first be an event which is a loss to the corporation, in
whatever form it may take. Then you have a lawsuit, the purported
effect of which is to recoup that loss to the corporation. If the cer3

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.

976 (1969).
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tainty of recovery from the derivative suit of the full amount were at
the level of one, so that the company was going to be made whole
for the loss, then what you would see on the initial event would be a
very minor loss or none at all, because if the legal system is going to
provide it with full recoupment, with appropriate interest, no loss
has taken place. The lawsuit is going to fully redress the matter.
What we can expect to see here is that there isn't an anticipation of
full recovery from the lawsuit. You can therefore trace a series of
events. The filing of the lawsuit gives you a certain possibility of a
recovery and then, as different events take place and uncertainty is
resolved, the expected value starts to change. You have a dismissal
motion that is ruled on, you have an appeal of that to a higher court
that's ruled on, and even if the magnitude stays the same throughout, you are shifting the probability and you are going to be able to
pick up the signs. One of the interesting things in the Fischel-Bradley sample is that, in several cases, they actually have the same lawsuit proceeding through the courts at different stages and you can
compare the market reaction among other things for consistency.
When you have the dismissal granted, for example, is that a negative
or positive event? If the dismissal is affirmed, then that should have
the same sign. If it's reversed, you can see if the sign is opposite.
Furthermore, you can get a little better fix on magnitude. If all
you're picking up is magnitude at one stage in this process, then you
have no reason to think that's the full order of magnitude. It's being
spread over a series of events and probability reassessments. You
get a little better fix on magnitude if you start to add up these different stages. You are never going to get a full measure of magnitude. As Dan and Mike were saying, you'll get a somewhat better
understanding of the parameters of your world. You don't get a
perfect measure.
The theory that we've heard about derivative suits is that a
lot of these actions are clandestine, secret profits that need a private
attorney general to discover them. Obviously, if that is the theory,
then something that is so widely disclosed is not going to be a good
example of the justification that's being asserted for derivative suits.
Once something is publicly disclosed, the value of a suit is very, very
small, even as a deterrence measure, unless you are going to tell the
story of the 64 year old manager with no final payments, no lost
pension, or anything else. At the end, the market penalizes people,
once things are publicly known. So, it's precisely in those examples
where something is publicly known and you have a lot of leakage
that the deterrent value of the suit is the least important. Those are
the kinds of cases where the world would probably not look much
different without any suits. It's only in those circumstances where
FiSCHEL:

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 71:357

you need somebody to bring information to bear about managerial
misconduct that is not already known to the market that you can tell
a good theoretical story for justifying derivative suits.
6. Is the Market Efficient?
It seems to me that not only a lot of literature, but a lot of
the discussions that we've had today, have assumed the efficiency of
the market in the sense of the capability of the market rapidly both
to obtain and to interpret accurately very complex information. Are
we now questioning the whole efficient market hypothesis as applied
to this sort of information?
WEISS:

DEMSETZ: I think the rejoinder to Elliott's question is that, from the
viewpoint of the investigator, evaluating the evidence bearing on a
specific point of interest is very complex. There are lots of things
involved in the evidence, including some reaction to the event by
the persons involved. This in no way says that the market isn't putting a fair estimate on the total bundle of effects. So you could have
the efficient market pricing these things on an expected basis appropriately and still make it difficult to ferret out the evidence that you
want for this manuscript.

In Weiss's question, he used the word efficient. It doesn't
mean that the market doesn't make mistakes, it means that the mistakes have an average variant of zero. Also, it means that information available now is fully reflected in the market, in the sense that
you can't expect any trends to occur. It would be better if we abandoned the word efficient and used the word unbiased.
ALCHIAN:

7. Suggestionsfor Further Empirical Work
We make the point in the paper that there is a bag of
money on the table here, and as the suit goes, presumably so goes
the bag of money. What we would like to have done here would
have been to gather the facts of the cases as to what is the magnitude of the bag of money. For example, a lot of studies on greenmail
have done this. I would recommend an extension in this area to put
that money into the analysis and see if there is any inference drawn.
After all, we were looking for more than just the bags of money on
the table; but, rather, does this have implications for future production and investment decisions?
In that same regard, if there is a deterrent here, we may be
missing something. Jon's doing a study, and Dan and I are doing
similar work, looking at the effect of the Van Gorkom case. This type
of social experiment, namely Delaware v. nonDelaware, is another
line of extension that I think is very worthwhile.
BRADLEY:
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It would be nice to know if you took a sample of other
firms in the same industry and ran exactly the same test and did not
find a result that you are reporting here. Then one could be certain
that you are getting an effect attributed to the court decision.
PASHIGIAN:

Why wouldn't that be just verification of the lack of spillover into other firms in the industry?
DEMSETZ:

That's right. That would also be verification that the
ruling does not cover all firms in the industry. That leads me really
to the second point. You might find that you are going to get comparable effects, which would be consistent with the idea that the ruling is now inferred to apply to all firms in the industry.
PASHIGIAN:

It depends on the nature of the case. It may be that you
want to look for your check at a set of firms whose plants were in the
same location if the complaint was related, say, to environmental
issues or something of that nature.
MANNE:

BRADLEY:

The issue of the overall deterrent effect would be worth

pursuing.
I was going to ask if we could perform an idealized experiment. Suppose the states differed in their attitude toward derivative suits. Could we get that kind of data from the states with and
without to see if the rates of return differ between the two?
ALCHIAN:

There are some states where the special litigation committee is given complete discretion to dismiss the suit, other states
where the special litigation committee is given no discretion to dismiss the suit.
FISCHEL:

DEMSETZ:

FISCHEL:

When did those differences emerge?
Recently.

So that you could have an event study on emergence of
those differences?
DEMSETZ:

WEISS: In an event study I participated in, we looked at both Maldonado when it came down in the Chancery Court, which I think was a
surprise, and we looked again at Maldonado when it came down in
the Delaware Supreme Court. We didn't compare Delaware corporations to the market because there are too many Delaware corporations included in the market indices. We found no effect as to either
of those decisions.
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One thing that I want to propose, at least briefly, is whether
organizations like the Business Roundtable and the ALI and even
people like us ought to be exerting some sort of pressure on groups
like the Administrative Office so that the right kind of data will be
kept in the future. I think there is a golden opportunity right now. I
recently had conversations with a number of federal district court
judges, and they are all interested in computerized docketing and
case management files. Apparently the Administrative Office is doing very little about a systematic policy on this. I would hate to
think that three or four years from now every federal district court in
the United States of America will have its own software and keep
slightly different records for slightly different purposes. Since the
statistics will not be kept on a comparable basis, empirical researchers will tear their hair looking for comparable sets of statistics. It's
not worth doing a project like this, identifying what data should be
kept, simply to resolve the question of corporate liability. But there
are many similar questions about other kinds of legal policies and
we simply don't have the facts. We have the opportunity now to
give some guidance to the development of a system that five or ten
years from now would enable us to address some of these questions
with richer models.
GOETZ:

E.

Comparison with Other Countries

To my knowledge, Germany, Japan, and probably a lot of
other countries with substantial and successful corporate systems
have no such thing as a derivative suit. Indeed, there is no liability
for most of the things that we're talking about, and what liability
there is, is criminal liability. They're getting along all right. I think
we ought to examine why it is that they are surviving without such
rules when we are saying in effect that we need a lot more of them.
MANNE:

There is, I think, one distinction at least between German and American systems. I think our share ownership is much
more broadly based than the German.
SCHWARTZ:

What's the cause and effect? If you have a different kind
of liability system, you get a restructuring of the ownership of the
corporation. That's not an exogenous event.
DEMSETZ:

Would you explain that? How might a rule of no liability
result in concentrated holdings by bank agents?
MANNE:

Let's suppose you have a system in which corporate management is less likely to be found in violation of law for violating the
interest of shareholders, that the courts just don't handle those
DEMSETZ:
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cases for some reason or other. One of the consequences of this
would be that the ownership structure of the corporation will become much more concentrated, so that the owners can, in fact, take
care of themselves.
WEISS: Henry, your suggested cross-cultural comparison raises a
host of very complicated questions. My impression of a number of
those advanced industrial societies that don't have derivative suits is
that in many of them, at least, there is also, for example, a much
higher degree of government substantive regulation of corporate
activity. At the same time, the idea of a corporation mounting litigation to challenge some government administrative action also is virtually unheard of. It seems to me that before one asks why they
don't have derivative suits in Germany or Japan, one needs to look
at a whole host of cultural phenomena as to the role of litigation, the
relationship of government to corporations, the social contract,
other social values, and the degree of uniformity that exists in those
societies as opposed to the diversity of our society.
Your point is well taken. It is precisely that kind of analysis
that Fischel-Bradley were pursuing in this paper, trying to find those
other factors here that should push us in one direction or the other.
As for Germany, I doubt that German industry is suffering today
under as many bureaucratic regulations as U.S. business. I can't say
for Japan; one hears mixed stories, and I think they get a little bit
garbled in translation.
MANNE:

III
OPTIONAL LIABILITY RULES

A.

Forms of Opting Out of Liability Rules

What is the cost of contracting out? Is it difficult., when
is it expensive, when is it not expensive? And that's really a question of information on my part. I'm sure the lawyers here are better
suited to explain why that is either very expensive, and therefore
firms are unable to do that, or it isn't. And if it isn't, and we see
firms not contracting out, why don't we say a liability rule is, in fact,
part of an optimal portfolio of devices for limiting agency costs?
PASHIGIAN:

I'm not sure the courts would tolerate contracting out of
duties of loyalty. That's certainly true in the trust area. The courts
simply will not tolerate that kind of contracting out. You can contract out of the duty of care within limits in the trust area and I
would predict that that division would carry over into the corporate
area as well.
To some extent, we do see contracting out. In tax shelter proCARNEY:
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spectuses, for example, we see a long description of the conflicts of
interest between promoter and general partner of the tax shelter
and the investors that he's going to deal with. Clearly those disclosures are designed to put investors on notice that they are going to
have to live with this particular set of problems under the duty of
loyalty. I don't know how many lawsuits take place challenging the
breach of the duty of loyalty later on in those settings, but the fact is
that lawyers are trying to find ways to make disclosures, to contract
out of some of those problems.
Corporate statutes provide for indemnification of officers and
directors, which is one form of contracting out. You can do that
within the limits of the duty of care cases, at least where there is a
finding under the Model Act and a number of other statutes that the
acts that the officer or director took were not knowingly against the
interest of the corporation. Most corporate bylaws pick up on that
language in the statute and incorporate it so that it becomes a standard part of the contract of all officers and directors in major corporations and even in closely held corporations. There's no such thing
for the duty of loyalty violations. You simply don't have the ability to
contract out of those by statute.
FISCHEL: With respect to this contracting out, it's a little more subtle than might appear to be the case. For example, a firm can significantly contract out of liability rules just by having a majority of
independent directors or having at least enough independent directors who can constitute a quorum. If there is disclosure to them, a
transaction which would otherwise be subject to judicial scrutiny will
either not be subject to judicial scrutiny at all or will be subject to
judicial scrutiny under a lower standard. The corporation's internal
governance mechanism acts as a substitute for judicial enforcement.
So there are a lot of things a corporation can do structurally to affect
the probability that decisions made by the corporation will be challenged in court.
Much the same is true with shareholder voting. To take a classic case, let's say there's a sale of an asset by a director to a corporation, the board of which he serves on. It's not an arm's length
transaction per se. Under traditional corporate law principles, that
transaction could be challenged in court. Depending on what time
you are taking about, or what jurisdiction you are talking about, it
would either be prohibited or, at the very least, would be subject to
a high level ofjudicial scrutiny. Now, let's say the corporation with
the identical transaction is organized somewhat differently, so that
the terms of the transaction, as well as the financial interest of the
director, are disclosed to a group of directors who do not have a
financial stake in that transaction. Those directors take the position
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that the transaction is beneficial for the corporation. If you have
that second step, again depending on what jurisdiction you are in,
that transaction will either be completely immunized from judicial
review or, at the very least, subject to a lower standard of judicial
review, simply because you have internal monitors who substitute
for what the courts will do. So you can do a lot contractually ex ante
to minimize the probability that decisions made within the firm will
be challenged under fiduciary duty standards and reviewed by
judges.
I just want to comment on what Bill Carney said about
indemnification, which is an example of contracting out to some extent. A number of corporations, beginning probably in the 30s, began to indemnify officers and directors against certain injuries or
expenses that they incurred, so that if an officer of a corporation
serves at the company's direction as an officer of another corporation, and is sued for some violation of the law or some breach of
duty, that director can be indemnified by the corporation that asked
him to serve. Specifically, in the context that we are speaking about,
an officer or director who is sued for breach of fiduciary duty or
breach of the duty of loyalty, for example, the kind of transaction
that Dan just described, is allowed under the contractual provisions
of the corporation in most jurisdictions to be indemnified for the
expenses he incurs in that lawsuit. But, and this is in contrast to
what Bill said, if he goes to trial and is found to have breached his
duty, he cannot be indemnified under the corporation laws.
SCHWARTZ:

FISCHEL: Don's statement was correct, but it's incomplete. You can

insure for the amount you have to pay in judgment in all duty of
care cases and in duty of loyalty cases as long as you are not found
to have acted deliberately.
Dan, I think to round out the statement, you can't even
insure against all of the breaches of duty of due care. The insurance
company is likely not to insure against reckless behavior, which is
maybe just an extreme case of neglecting one's duties. Also, you
have to remember that the insurance companies will very frequently
provide for very substantial deductibles on their insurance policies,
$25,000-$50,000 in some cases so that there is still a substantial exposure to personal loss notwithstanding the availability of both indemnification and insurance.
SCHWARTZ:

I guess you could view the whole debate over the litigation committee as whether or not the law, whether in the form of a
judge or in the form of regulatory agency, wants to permit using the
WOLFSON:
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independent director as the ultimate opt-out device that would winnow out all loyalty cases.
Scorr: I think it's useful to follow up on this opting out, which ties
into indemnification and insurance and shows us why the answer to
Peter's question is convoluted and in some ways uncertain. There's
yet another factor, and that is that some of these indemnification
and insurance arrangements may be subject to being questioned by
the court and not allowed to be enforced as contrary to public policy
in the view of the judge.
That happened in the district court decision in Gould vs. American Hawaiian Steamship Co.4 where the director was serving on the
board of Company "B" because Company "A" was a significant
stockholder in Company "B". This was an example in my view of a
judge who didn't understand the transaction, imposing liability improperly. In any event, he imposed liability on a personal basis on
this director to the tune of $1 million. Then he denied any indemnification to the director from Company "B" for that liability and it
was not at all clear from his opinion whether he would believe in
permitting indemnification from Company "A" for that director. So
you've got this "contrary to public policy" notion that impairs the
enforcement of some of these indemnifications or insurance arrangements even if you think you have contracted for them.
You slipped in that "or insurance" after discussing that
case. Given what I recall of that case, I think it doesn't involve
insurance.
MANNE:

Scorr: It doesn't involve insurance, but it makes you wonder
whether the judge would apply the same reasoning to an insurance
policy. The SEC has taken that position with respect to indemnification and insurance under the 1933 Act.
One of the factors that will influence what set of contracts
you observe is how confident you are in how the person who is going to resolve the issues that come up under those contracts will
resolve them. In a sense the set of contracts is not independent
from the critical comments that have been made about judges. If
you really did not have a lot of confidence in judges you would anticipate, for example, a lot of use of arbitration or other methods
where you could substitute somebody with much more expertise
than the judge for resolving disputes and opt out that way. Actually,
I've been troubled for a long time about why there isn't more use of
FIsCHEL:
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1976).

362 F. Supp. 771 (D. Del. 1973), vacated and remanded, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.
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that type of dispute resolution. So I think it is interesting to have
some discussion about what the costs are of that form of dispute
resolution so that people don't use it more frequently.
I've been thinking about some new institutions using the
public choice approach. They fit in perfectly here. Stockholders
could vote on setting up a committee to deal with the possible derivative suit. Another method simply would be to use an accounting
firm. There might be a specialized firm. As a third alternative, a
group of fairly large stockholders who are not on the board of directors but who, if they are compensated once every five years when a
suit comes up, would be a suitable mechanism. It would seem to me
that this would be much cheaper and easier than a court procedure.
As far as I know, nobody complains about the board of directors
actually nominating an accounting firm, and the stockholder vote on
it is pretty routine. It would probably be pretty routine on this too.
The motives of the board of directors for not choosing an accounting firm that is well known to overlook embezzlement are obvious.
TULLOCK:

My understanding is that, as far as the claims brought under
the federal securities laws, Dan, you can't agree to arbitrate, you've
got to go to court. I've heard data that the frequency with which
derivative suits are brought against particular firms-like once every
18 years-is so low that the cost of engaging in an arbitration agreement that would cover that small set of claims would probably outweigh the benefits.
MACEY:

The data that Jack Coffee has found shows that, I think,
once every seventeen or eighteen years is the incidence of a derivative suit against any particular corporation.
SCHWARTZ:

Just a short informational point. There are now two state
statutes that permit the appointment of independent persons other
than directors to function as a special litigation committee. In the
Pennsylvania statute, there are quite elaborate provisions on the
amount of deference the court has to give to their decision.
DOOLEY:

There is a recent Supreme Court case, Dean Witter v. Byrd,5
that contains a concurring opinion that suggests that the question of
whether arbitration will be available to these kinds of cases is wide
open. In his concurring opinion, Justice White casts considerable
doubt on the proposition that an earlier case, Wilko v. Swann,6 which
concluded that arbitration was not available with regard to claims
MOFSKY:

5
6

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S.Ct. 1238 (1985).
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, is applicable to the 1934 Act. Thus,
it may well be that arbitration will be compelled with respect to
claims arising under the 1934 Act.
I want to suggest that, in a way, some of the substantive
doctrines are arbitration provisions. The corporate opportunities
doctrine says that if a corporate opportunity is open to one of the
directors or managers, it has to be presented to the board of directors which will then decide whether the director can proceed. The
theory, I take it, is that you draft the jurisdictional scope of the rule
very widely, so that almost any transaction in the relevant area will
have to be brought to the board and the board will then decide.
You don't have a system under which the directors and managers go
off and engage in the transaction and then wait for litigation to occur. If you are a director or manager, and if there is any doubt at all,
your course is to simply bring it to the board, which gives you a
binding decision.
LEUBSDORF:

B.

Desirability of Permitting Corporations to Opt Out of
Liability Rules
1. In General

Why not let these firms arrange their own affairs as they
please in the absence of some kind of demonstrable externality effect? I would think that's where the issue would be joined.
DEMSETZ:

It's not exactly as if a choice were then to be left to some
objective scientist who will experiment and choose something that
might be successful, or which might not, but in any event based
upon a desire to improve the welfare of the corporation.
The choice that is made for corporations is made by the managers themselves, the ones who are vulnerable to litigation. The
choice is a self-interested choice. The choice among the states is,
again, not a choice made by informed legislators after a process that
we are familiar with. You've got state legislation in this area that is
unaccompanied by public hearings, by any kind of a record, or by
any kind of committee reports. Local bar associations for the most
part write the corporate laws of most states. Those state bar associations follow the lead of corporate law committees which are
committees composed of lawyers who represent people who are going to be affected by these rules.
Moreover, the differences from one state to another in this area
are not very significant. What Delaware decides is essentially followed by courts in other jurisdictions because they don't have the
litigation experience that Delaware has, so that there isn't the kind
SCHWARTZ:
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of free interplay in a market place that's been sort of romantically
described.
FISCHEL: You think, apparently, and the drafters of the ALI think, at
least implicitly, that these choices about contractual form, which you
refer to as self-interested, are therefore suspect. There are two important responses to that.
First, there is a lot of economic theory and evidence relating to
one very simple insight: No matter how self-interested managers
are, investment is still voluntary. The investment market is one of
the most competitive markets there is. It is very, very difficult for
managers to make what you refer to as self-interested choices in organizational forms in a way that operates to shareholders' detriment
because shareholders have an infinite number of alternative investment opportunities. In fact, we see things like firms voluntarily subjecting themselves to independent accountants, the evolution of
independent directors, resort to capital markets, and all kinds of voluntary monitoring devices. It's no answer, if you see a situation
where firms do not voluntarily subject themselves to something, to
say that that's self-interested. It's just as plausible, if not more plausible, to reach the opposite conclusion-that they don't subject
themselves to it because investors don't value it.
Second, there is a kind of nirvana fallacy in the argument that
manager's decisions are self-interested, therefore they should not
be respected. The question is, whose decision should be respected?
In this context, as well as all other areas of the ALI project, the
choice is between managers who are disciplined by a variety of different markets in situations where there is no problem that's been
demonstrated, versus a group of, primarily, law professors who want
to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the managers who
are disciplined by markets and say that because the management's
incentives are not perfect, because they are self-interested, that
means that the law professor's judgment is better. That doesn't
follow.
I'd like to respond to the point that was raised by Don
Schwartz with regard to choice being dominated by management on
these issues. I'm sure this is an important point. I'm not quite clear
as to what the truth is on this score. Ken Lehn and I have just done
a paper which will appear shortly in the Journalof PoliticalEconomy in
which we find for 511 Fortune 500 size firms that the five largest
shareholding interests, on the average, own about twenty-six percent of the shares of the companies. This is hardly a picture of the
"diffuse" shareholder not able to attend to his interest. I think
there is considerable evidence, in fact, that choice will not be domiDEM ETZ:
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nated by management, even in very large corporations. We find
also that variations in the concentration of ownership of corporations follow what we considered to be sensible, economic dictates in
the market-place, so this is not just some random ownership structure but one that changes from firm to firm depending upon conditions under which the firm operates. So there is more evidence that
there is a market determined control mechanism in operation here
than we would infer from merely looking at the market for takeovers. This has nothing to do with takeovers, actually.
I don't know that courts or legislatures have ever viewed
corporate relationships as purely contractual. I don't think that
many people view corporate law as involving purely contractual values. I think there are many people in this society who view corporations as social and political as well as economic institutions and are
therefore concerned about the social and political impact of even
internal governance rules of corporate law, insofar as they have
some impact on corporations' economic, social and political
behavior.
WEISS:

I'd like to expand on some of Elliott Weiss's comments. It seems to me that an important value here is legitimacy of
the corporate government. Of course, the government has an important interest in preserving its own legitimacy. For instance,
problems of theft are not confined to directors and managers-they
could occur throughout the corporation. It's equally clear that you
can't prevent them simply by going around and threatening to impose sanctions. You need to have some basic atmosphere of reliability and responsibility among all the employees of the corporation.
How are you going to have that if it becomes clear that the managers have a considerable ability to enter into self-dealing transactions
without any legal consequence? A self-interested shareholder
would want to preserve some check, even if it was very rarely used,
simply to preserve the morale of the corporation as a whole.
But I think it really goes beyond that. Corporate officers are
exercising a lot of power, making important decisions, and they
should be responsible in some way to the people, to their various
constituencies. Government officials can be brought into court in
all sorts of ways to have their decisions challenged. It's true that to
hold them financially liable is rather difficult. You usually wind up
simply with a court judgment about the legality of the act with an
injunction requiring different behavior in the future. But I think
that the public is going to insist on some kind of remedy, at least in
our society. There may be other societies in which it is accepted
that someone who is in power is probably acting for the best and no
LEUBSDORF:
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one thinks of saying you have to have a court remedy. But I think
ours is different, and that leads me to predict that if you were to
limit derivative suits, probably you would find the law governing
other remedies expanding. Shareholders, or other people perhaps,
would simply be bringing suits that did not go through the
corporation.
Bill Carney talked about the contracting out in tax shelters. That's a particularly interesting illustration because a real bargain is struck in those situations. In order to attract investors into a
tax shelter deal, the promoters say we're going to run this thing and
we are going to advise it and we are going to be charging fees for
everything we do. There are conflicts between your interest and
ours in some respect. However, the trade-off is we'll give you
ninety-nine percent of the tax benefit. What I hear proposed is that
for nothing particular in return managers should now contract out
of liability rules. I'm not sure what the quid pro quo is in that bargain, but in the one Bill described certainly there is a quid pro quo.
SCHWARTZ:

CARNEY: The quid pro quo when managers contract out of liability

is a stock price adjustment. If managers contract out of too much
liability from an efficiency perspective, stock prices will drop. If
managers are contracting out of the optimal amount of liability,
whatever that is, stock prices should rise. I expect efficient markets
to make the adjustments over time to reflect that. As long as managers' wealth is invested to a substantial extent in the shares of stock
of the company, managers will pay a price for contracting out if they
contract out excessively.
I wanted to pick up on Weiss's comment on corporate law
being designed to achieve policies other than the interests of the
parties concerned. I think too much can be made of that distinction
because one can really say the same thing about almost every compartment of law, including contract law. There are, after all, contracts that we don't allow people to make as contrary to public
policy. We regulate private transactions in various ways. There is
no reason why we shouldn't do the same thing with corporate law.
But in contract law there is at least a prima facie case to let the parties do what they want. Then, if one can identify some third party
with societal interest to counterpose to that, you can rebut the prima
facie case. I think that the suggestion has just been made here that
the same thing is being done.
Bob Scott and I have recently written on the difficulties of opting out. There is always an advantage to the standard form contract,
whatever it is. There is always a certain security in the status quo.
GOETZ:
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Parties can never be quite sure that the courts will enforce an unconventional agreement. But even if one thinks that the courts will
enforce it, there is some uncertainty as to how a nonstandard contract will be construed. Particularly in complex areas, parties may
strive to write language that governs their relationship in a particular way, but until the language has been tested in the courts, parties
don't know really what their agreement means. Such contracts are
not really reliable.
The third thing which cuts contrary to taking a contractarian
free market approach is recognizing differences in market behavior.
There is a terrible free rider problem in the processing of information with respect to group choices. For an individual's own private
purchases, he bears all the consequences. By contrast, the Public
Choice literature explains why rational persons will not be as well
informed with respect to political decisions. Agreeing to an opting
out or a change in the corporate charter fits the political model.
There are, therefore, potential informational benefits from some
kind of standardization and limiting of the number of options.
Thus, the ALI need not allow parties to do absolutely anything
under the sun. It can create a limited menu of standard form contracts that embody divergent philosophies. Then, over the course
of time, people would become familiar with the language of those
alternative forms of agreement. Allen Schwartz has written in the
contract area pointing out similar advantages in standardization of
warranty forms. People can then evaluate the alternatives more securely in a world of costly information where we must confess that a
lot of people are ill-informed.
WEIss: I wasn't arguing that corporations ought to be viewed as

primarily social or primarily political, but even if one accepts the
premise that they are primarily economic insitutions, there is a lot of
room for dispute about when-and on the basis of what other facts,
values, or institutions-we ought to allow noneconomic values to
intrude or carry weight when we are setting the ground rules.
I had some experience with institutional investors and their voting on matters that were probably of only trivial economic importance-shareholder proposals-largely relating to social issues.
Even though these matters were often of no great importance, the
investors often were subjected to significant pressures, by people
with whom they did business, concerning their voting decisions.
This experience suggests to me that we should not be too confident
that institutional investors, when they are making proxy voting decisions about matters concerning which there is debate and uncertainty, are always motivated to make sure that their votes will
maximize the return on their investments. I think those decisions
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probably reflect a balance among a number of pressures, and I'm
not sure how the institutions draw that balance. If anybody has any
specific data about that process, I'd be glad to hear about it, but in
the absence of data, I remain skeptical.
I was intrigued by what Charlie said about having a limited
menu of standard form contracts. I've thought about that issue a
lot, particularly in connection with the mandatory disclosure system.
I never know how to interpret that kind of argument. Is it different
from saying that we should only allow a limited number of different
ways to make widgets, for example? Corporate decisions involve
presumptively higher information costs than consumers face. There
really seems to be some trade-off between innovation and information costs.
With respect to some of the comments about the other values
that have to be taken into account, the stated purpose of derivative
suits generally is to make shareholders better off. So if you say there
is no evidence that it makes shareholders better off, then the response is, well, maybe it makes somebody else better off. The problem of making somebody else better off is that it makes shareholders
worse off. It becomes a completely amorphous, nontestable, theoretically inconsistent kind of a position. So at least as long as the
derivative suit, unlike, for example, the criminal law, is defined as a
monitoring mechanism for the benefit of investors, I think it is better to talk about it in those terms.
FISCHEL:

MACEY: Even if we don't care about benefiting shareholders, and we
want to promote other values, societal values, it still leaves open the
question of why either derivative suits or class action suits are the
proper vehicle for championing these other values given the fact
that I think every one recognizes the kinds of strategic behavior that
can be associated with these activities. It seems to me that some
kind of constitutional or democratic process is the appropriate vehicle for that kind of legislation rather than some sort of ad hoc litigation idea.
WOLFSON: There are scores of suits out there in the country, and
judges are making decisions as to the scope of opt out provisions
under state law or even under the Securities Act of '33. For example, insurance has a wider scope of protection of the fiduciary than
does indemnification. Does the Fischel-Bradley paper direct the
judge to move in one direction or the other?

The paper is really not specifically addressed to that kind
of question. If it's really a contractual provision that's in the charFISCHEL:
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ter, I would say what I would say, to all questions like that: Absent
demonstrable third party effects, I would enforce whatever the
agreement is.
Let me pursue this just one second further. The judge
might ask you, "Look, if in fact, liability provisions have a fruitful
impact on directoral behavior, which is really a layman's description
of what we're talking about on opt out, then that will impact me in
my mix of policy making and decision as I reach my result. Do you
have any recommendation to make?" In other words, if liability
rules have little or no impact on directoral behavior because of the
other alternatives, the judge might reach one conclusion. If the mix
of liability rules will have a significant effect on directoral behavior,
then the judge might reach a different conclusion.
WOLFSON:

FISCHEL: I would say, "You,Judge, are not in the business of rewriting contracts for the parties." That question is no different than,
let's say, a contract between two people to build widgets a certain
way, and somebody sues for breach, saying they should have been
built a different way.
don't think we have sufficiently paid attention in our
analysis to what I believe is the fundamental vagueness of the loyalty
doctrine. The longer I look at it, the more I study it, and the more I
teach it, I find myself increasingly unable to articulate the doctrine,
other than to repeat the word that you see in so many cases, fairness. It seems to me for that reason, and for others, that there is a
real need to increase the ability to opt out or apply some kind of
informed consent doctrine for stockholders, in which they could be
given a menu and the corporation could say "I choose to be under
the regulations of the 1933 Act, or I choose to be under the regulations of the Investment Company Act of 1940, or under this incredibly vague doctrine called duty of loyalty, hence, buy my stock, don't
buy the stock of my competitor in the steel industry who by charter
provision has. opted out of those provisions." It would seem to me
an appropriate approach to take. I would recommend such an opt
out provision, which would come close to eliminating reliance on
duty of loyalty and reliance on many other statutory protective
provisions.
WOLFSON: I

CARNEY: One of the problems that I have when we come to the dis-

cussion of the duty of loyalty, is that I think the area includes two
kinds of cases. One is cases involving managers and their fairly
straightforward dealings with their own firm. The other set of cases
usually involve some conflicts of a majority stockholder that caused
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the firm to do something, usually merge or sell its assets to the dominant stockholder. I have a lot of trouble lumping many of those
cases in with this discussion. They tend to get lumped in with this
discussion either because the directors, who are agents of the majority stockholder, are seen as breaching a duty when, in fact, what's
going on is that a person who holds the votes has caused a transaction to happen. Those are really ex post disputes about the division
of the proceeds of the transaction between the majority and the minority. They tend to get treated under this vague fairness rubric
that Nick Wolfson has referred to. Those cases don't belong under
the discussion of duty of loyalty at all. I think that when you take
them out, you will find that what's left, in many cases, is fairly trivial
in terms of investor interest. The amount that managers are stealing, if that's the appropriate word to use, is so minor that there is
not really much to talk about.
2.

Opting Out Through Independent Directors

With respect to opting out through internal and external
monitors, it seems to me, first of all, if we look at external monitors,
particularly accountants, there are fairly detailed performance standards, GAAS and GAAP, and we have increasingly stringent liability
rules.
When we look at the internal monitors, particularly disinterested directors, which is the way it is usually defined, the courts
don't make determinations about whether people are independent,
in the sense that one usually means when using that term, but about
whether the directors in question are disinterested in terms of having no pecuniary interest in a transaction or no subordinate relationship to the people making or benefiting from a decision. There
also are very few specific standards, analogous to GAAS or GAAP,
concerning what those directors are supposed to be doing. The liability threat is almost nonexistent with respect to directors when
performing a monitoring function, so long as they do something.
The courts usually fall back on the rationale that, after all, these are
the people who have been elected by the shareholders. It seems to
me that this really is not a very convincing argument, at least in corporations with diffuse share ownership. The directors, by and large,
are selected by management and serve at the invitation of
management.
A really central issue raised by the ALI project about liability
rules is: to what extent should a corporation be allowed to opt out
of substantive judicial review of transactions by having these directors review it? I believe the ALI project should very much limit this
sort of opting out, at least where the "independent" directors are
WEISS:
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passing on what we traditionally class as duty of loyalty transactions,
and where they are being asked then to pass on the merits of litigation alleging breaches of the duty of loyalty. In all those situations,
the lack of standards, the lack of liability threats, and the possibility
of manipulation reduce very much our degree of confidence that
these people will be effective monitors. Therefore, dispositive
weight should not be attached to their decisions.
In response to what Elliott said, the question is a relative
one of benefits of different systems, all of which have certain imperfections attached to them. Just as it does not follow that you should
never have liability rules because some judges are appointed for
political reasons rather than on merit, nor does it follow that you
should not give deference to decisions by directors because they are
not perfectly independent. It's not in the interest of the firm to
structure a set of contracts in a way that monitoring proceedings are
a sham. That would be costly, and they have no incentive to do that,
just like they have no incentive, at least ex ante, to pick an accounting firm that's not really going to provide independent monitoring.
To the extent that monitoring is valuable, the firm will pay a price in
the market for doing that.
FISCHEL:

3.

The Problem of One-Shot Expropriation

Scorr: The issue of "why not go for an optional structure" is not a
bad way of focusing the discussion. As I indicated in my comments
in my paper, the long run arguments that can be made for that kind
of a regime, I think, are fairly compelling. The main thing that troubles me is the short run or transitional aspects of that kind of a
change in our legal structure. That gets you into this question as to
the already existing firm where you have a large shareholder base
and investment in reliance upon a set of mandatory rules that impose some constraints, although the definition of those constraints
is somewhat fuzzy, as we've been developing. To what extent is
there an opportunity for one shot expropriation by incumbent controllers of the firm?
These would have to be voted in to the charter, so it's
not a question of management announcing on their own that this is
going to be the procedure for this corporation. It seems to me that
this at least partially, perhaps fully, addresses the short run problem. They could not in the short run abscond with the assets and
expropriate the shareholders, without their consent at least.
PASHIGIAN:

Scorr: In a draft paper by Vic Brudney that I was looking at earlier
this week, he goes on at length to make the counter argument that
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the contract paradigm is not appropriate, that the notion of one-onone bargaining by informed principals, acting volitionally, does not
describe adequately the corporate shareholder voting context for
the large corporation with the information cost and free rider
problems associated with it. That would permit, therefore, a degree
of expropriation by incumbent controllers.
I don't think that is wholly imaginary. One study that I've been
meaning to do is to look at transactions proposed to shareholder
vote in which the initial market reaction was a negative abnormal
return of some non-trivial order of magnitude, greater than 1%, and
look at the shareholder vote where the market reaction to the transaction was a negative evaluation, where you had a management recommendation for the transaction.
I have observed a number of instances, but I don't know how
large a section of the whole they are, in which those kinds of negative transactions, endorsed by management, were in fact ratified by
shareholders. It's that same kind of phenomenon that might apply
here to the question of a proposal to move from mandatory structure to some kind of optional structure. Would there be a significant expropriation cost with that? If it were significant, it would be
politically very damaging to the cause of optional liability rules because it would undermine the case for the long run benefits of it.
I wonder if we haven't seen examples of exactly what
Ken described with respect to shark repellent provisions that a
number of companies have adopted. Those are the anti-takeover
charter provisions that have made it more difficult for companies to
be taken over. As I understand it, the studies that GreggJarrell and
others have done show that there have been nontrivial adverse reactions to the adoption of those proposals. Here we have seen management motivated by a serious conflict of interest, protecting their
own employment against the possibility of a takeover, plunging
ahead with proposals to shareholders which, for the most part, they
have ratified notwithstanding the heavy incidence of informed institutional investors who do not find it in their interest to have these
anti-takeover provisions. Isn't that a case that would trouble those
who favor a contractual basis of limiting exposure in liabilities?
SCHWARTZ:

In reference to what Don Schwartz referred to as the
shark repellent evidence, the best published evidence is unable to
find a stock price effect of those amendments. The SEC study that
has Gregg Jarrell's name associated with it but perhaps not his authorship finds a negative price effect, but no statistician would say
that it was reliably different from zero. The reports of it in the press
have exaggerated those or picked up on the negative price. People
LEFTWICH:
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for various political reasons have adopted one view or the other on
that. I wouldn't necessarily defend those studies. They have
problems similar to those that Mike and Dan have as to how you
interpret the evidence. But the academic research suggests that
those price effects have not been detected if they are there.
My comment is in response to Ken Scott's proposed
study. I think, first of all, that it's difficult to know what the world is
going be to like if we went to the optional system that Peter is suggesting. For example, corporations, on the average, would tend to
become more tightly controlled in the optional system. I probably
count that as a good effect. Secondly, I hope you do the other half
of the study; when courts decide on issues bearing on shareholder
interest, look at the behavior of the price of the stock after the
court's decision and make a comparison between that and the voting
decisions that you want to look at.
DEMSETZ:

I know of three stock price studies that have been done
with respect to adoption of shark repellent amendments. One says
no significant effects at all, one says maybe some positive effects and
the other says maybe some negative effects. Richard was telling me
that the last one doesn't have any statistical significance. I'm kind of
disappointed in the economists, that we haven't been able to come
up with any real answers with all these event studies.
I think I know at least part of the reason why. I don't think
they've yet reached the point where they are asking the right questions. When shark repellents are proposed, they are a complex mix
of voting rules, price rules, and a variety of options available to
stockholders and boards. Nobody yet has tried to sort out all the
complications of these amendments to test for price effects with various voting rules, fair price rules, and that sort of thing.
At best, we get a separation of voting rules and fair price rules,
which I think is what Jarrell tried to do. At this point, I think the
economists need to talk to the lawyers before they do any more of
those studies. I suspect the same may be true in other areas, that we
need more communication with each other about the variations that
are taking place in the real world, so that we can test for things that
are really happening instead of lumping them all together.
CARNEY:

To call this a bargaining process may not be correct because of informational difficulties or because it is, after all, a voting
process with less than an absolute unanimity of acquiescence by the
affected parties. Ken Scott's problem is one that I agree with.
When the rules change, there is a possibility of exploitation. I'djust
like to recall the literature applied for many years to Public Choice
GOETZ:
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questions. Our fellow discussant Gordon Tullock is the co-author
of one of the best, seminal books on this, dealing with constitutional
rules and changing the nature of the social contract. One can view
the corporate contract in much the same way and at least raise the
question whether shark repellent and poison pills are equivalent to
changing the social contract or changing the constitutional rules. If
so, perhaps they should require special decision-making procedures. A lot has been written justifying two-thirds majorities, threequarters majorities, perhaps not allowing proxies when rule changes
are effected. There is also reference in that literature to what Bill
referred to a few minutes ago as mixing up things, like voting rules
and prices, where suggestions for alterations are bundled together.
There is literature on log rolling, how one can tell when issue packages are stuck together by people, what the implications of their being accepted or rejected really are. The literature also analyzes the
power that someone has who controls the components of the bundle, the agenda that is being voted upon.
MACEY: Given the fact that firms are subject to market constraints
that governments aren't, I'm not sure, Charlie, how effective it is to
transpose public choice literature onto corporate governance. I'm
not sure, but I'm prepared to be educated.
GOETZ: Jon, perhaps you are thinking of public choice models of
one big government with no other options. But certainly Tiebout
and others have discussed the phenomenon of people moving from
local government to local government, or from state to state or city
to city, so that there are market constraints in essence on governments as well, as long as people have options as to which government they belong to.
TULLOCK: The existence of the market mechanism means that you

don't have to worry nearly as much about the voting procedure, but
it doesn't mean that rules are worthless.
LErrwiCH: When you start talking about changing the rules of the
game in the middle of the game, you are going to impose some costs
on some parties. The ALI proposals if adopted would change the
rules of the game in the middle of the game. They would hurt some
parties and benefit some others. That's a very different issue from
saying, what if you were allowed to bring a company to market with
these rules in its charter? One transition arrangement might be to
allow a new product, such as a new contract, to come to market
without forcing everyone to have the same contract. It's quite often
the case, when the NYSE changes some of its requirements, that
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new issues brought to the floor are allowed to have these provisions,
but existing issues are restricted as to the provisions they already
contain. I think that distinction is worth maintaining in the sense
that you get a little bit away from this one-shot expropriation.
GOETZ: I don't think you can do what Richard suggested and allow
new rules to apply only to new contracts. Thus, only new corporations would be allowed carte blanche in their charters. It's a tempting suggestion unless one raises the question of the survival
characteristics, under those circumstances, of the existing corporations. Suppose the new rules really are more efficient and they provide advantages in the market-place. Are we really going to say to
the stockholders in existing corporations that there will be no transitional mechanism so that they can take advantage of the same more
efficient rules?
When is allowing contracting out tempered by some
concern that there will be an opportunity to exploit at least a minority interest in a corporation? I think that we just don't know at the
moment how easy such exploitation is, nor do we know how easy it
is to prevent it.
It might be useful to be thinking in terms of a more historical
perspective as to what kind of investors were in the market in the
twenties and what kind of investors are in the market today. My
casual impression is that in some ways we have more protection today than we did in the twenties. I'm inclined to believe that we
might see more roundlot purchases. We clearly have the opportunity to use all sorts of mutual funds today in making our purchases,
and we rely on agents to make investments for us. It's not clear to
me that, if you went back into the twenties, investors had those options. To the extent that one could demonstrate this kind of longterm shift it seems to me that one's concern about investor protection should diminish rather than increase. Therefore, the justification for imposing uniform liability rules is weakened to the extent
that trend has occurred.
PASHIGIAN:

What's disturbing is our inclination to sit here and state
what is to be done in the world without any evidence. We have got
our personal impressions about whether outside management is doing a good job or not, but you can't make policy, I hope, on that
kind of a premise. You've got to have some facts to support your
proposition. Illustrations don't work. For example, some of these
shark repellents have been damaging. Managers are not perfectly
foresighted. They make mistakes. Stocks go down. You've got to
ALCHIAN:
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give me systematic evidence that they are doing this against stockholders' interests, and we don't have it.
The stock corporation has been around for several hundred
years. It's been evolving over those years. What would you have
said back in 1500 about limited liability? Good idea or bad idea?
What I see here is, "Aw, it would be a terrible idea!" Yet it evolved.
I'm disturbed that we sit around here trying to make policy recommendations without having any good analysis about what is going
on. That's true of the lawyers and that's true of the economists, but
at least we try to get some evidence. It's just disturbing.
IV
THE ALl PROJECT IN GENERAL

A.

Effect of Project

DEMSETZ: When the ALl finishes its craftsmanship and the mem-

bers of the organization approve it, what does that mean? What
happens as a result of that? This certainly doesn't make it law.
Would somebody please inform me?
DOOLEY: This is only a partial response. Historically, the American

Law Institute projects have been quite influential in the courts.
What makes this doubly significant, I think, is that there is the same
kind of time-bomb lurking in § 8.30 of the Revised Model Business CorporationAct. That will have real consequences if § 8.30 is enacted as
it presently stands because before revision, the Model Act accounted for about half the corporate laws in the United States.
MANNE: The somewhat peculiar structure of the ALl corporate governance proposal also makes it more likely to be used as a model for
state legislation, so it may have a reach beyond its usual influence on
courts.
When the ALI votes on this thing and it becomes an
adopted document of the American Law Institute, it becomes quotable authority. It doesn't become law. It becomes an authoritative
statement by a recognized private association that tries to concern
itself with accurately stating and improving the law.
Let me give you an example: § 7.08 is a provision that we'll
probably talk about because that deals with the ability of the corporation to set up a special litigation committee to terminate derivative
suits. In the official comment, it says as to implementation,
SCHWARTZ:

"§ 7.08 could be implemented by judicial decision except in the
very few jurisdictions that have already adopted a statute gov-
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erning this area in which case legislative action would be
necessary."
What they are saying to a court is that you can use this as a model,
this is the American Law Institute's statement of what the law ought
to be. Traditionally, as Mike points out, ALI documents, which usually have been called Restatements, have been influential in terms of
what judges do.
Concerning how much influence this project might have
once it's adopted, it does differ from most ALI projects in the sense
that typically these projects have been Restatements, attempts to simply rearticulate the law, rather than to come up with novel legal
premises or legal rules. This project is also different from typical
ALI projects in terms of the degree of controversy that surrounds it.
I tend to think that many of the provisions have been sufficiently
discredited that many judges will refuse to give this project the deference usually accorded ALI projects.
MACEY:

B.

Change by Evolution or Decree

GOETZ: Given the deference which judges sometimes give to ALI
pronouncements, if there are a number of solutions which seem to
be reasonable solutions and in the ball park, why does a single best
one have to be adopted at all? If there are alternative institutions
which are defensible, then perhaps one should say so. By admitting
that we are incapable of picking with great security among those institutions, we would leave the question open and allow experimentation that might reveal to us what really does work.
FISCHEL: Given the uncertainties in this area and the point that
there is no reason to believe that every firm will have identical monitoring structures-that firms with, for example, highly concentrated
stock ownership might value something like derivative suits less
than firms with weaker internal monitoring devices-we don't see
any need to choose between one kind of rule over another kind of
rule. We would be much more content with the normal evolutionary process of contractual development within firms and competition between states. In fact, one of our fundamental critiques of the
ALI project, not just in this area but in other areas, is the need to
choose between alternative rules or alternative contractual structures when given the state of the evidence, it doesn't appear that
there is any problem that needs to be addressed in this area and
others, and to the extent that there is, there is no reason to believe
that all firms would resolve it in the same way.
WOLFSON:

Each of the decisions concerning derivative suits,
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whether we should have a one-step process or a two-step process,
and then whether demand should be viewed more or less carefully,
and all the host of other small decisions we're talking about, is obviously based upon sheer hunch at best. The ALI is making these
decisions purely on hunch. Therefore, these are essentially political
decisions. I know that the courts are making these decisions all the
time, but at least there's some difference of viewpoints among
courts in different jurisdictions, so there's some form of
experimentation.
There are two modes going on. The lawyer qua litigator is doing what has to be done out there. There he is, in a form of combat
or whatever. He has to do what he has to do. What he does is genuine in that sense. The lawyer qua scholar in these ALI type functions is engaging in a form of subterfuge. What he really should be
saying in each of the subsections of the ALI is, "We herewith toss a
coin, or we did it by trial by combat, or the stronger group prevailed
by arm-wrestling, hence we reached that conclusion."
V
FINE-TUNING THE DERIVATIVE SUIT:

SPECIFIC RULES AND

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

A.

Compensation of Plaintiff's Counsel

One of the central questions in this whole subject is the
implications of the system for attorneys' compensation. That may
be, after all, the small bit of fuel that's driving a very large vehicle.
MANNE:

Up until maybe a dozen years ago, the attorney fee,
in
all
cases determined finally by the court, was fixed on a
which is
theory known as the "salvage value" theory. That is, the attorneys'
compensation was based on a percentage of the recovery. About
1974 or so, a number of courts started adopting a different mode of
compensation known as the "lodestar" fee. Under this approach,
lawyers were paid as they would be in other contexts, based on the
value of their time, subject to adjustments. If it was an especially
difficult case, or an easy case, you might make adjustments from
their ordinary fee. This rule makes settlement at an early stage in
the litigation nearly impossible. You have got to let the thing get
strung out so that the time can be expended.
I also think that there ought to be a means of reducing the
temptation to file suits that are likely to be frivolous. Or, putting it
another way, plaintiff's counsel should be required to undertake a
pretty serious analysis so that suits that they are likely to bring are
those that have a high promise of being successful-in other words,
to go after the suits where there is really a problem and not just to
SCHWARTZ:
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file suits that have largely nuisance value. One way of dealing with
that is to readdress the problem of how we compensate plaintiffs
lawyers.
I think we should probably return to what had been the prevailing system of allowing plaintiffs lawyers to recover only when they
were successful on the part of their client, the corporation, rather
than on the basis of time.
Scorr: There is no obviously perfect solution to the attorneys' fee
issue, because it's a principal-agent problem and there is no perfect
incentive structure. There are degrees of imperfection. I would assume that the worst is to have an arrangement that does not in any
way relate the attorney's compensation to the success and the recovery in the lawsuit, or in the settlement. You have to have some
mechanism, therefore, for tying this reward to the value of the lawsuit as measured by the recovery. If it is not a damage lawsuit, if you
are seeking injunctive relief, or something like that, then the problem really gets difficult to measure and adfninister.
On the other hand, I don't really see why any of these problems
are any different in an important respect from other species of contingent fee litigation. A nonmeritorious lawsuit is a waste of time.
Unless you are a very unemployed lawyer with no competing alternatives, you want to bring causes of actions that have better chances
of success and higher expected values.
Ken suggests that the agency problems involved in the derivative suit plaintiff and the derivative suit lawyer's case are no
more exaggerated than they are in other instances of contingent fee
litigation. There is one very peculiar aspect to the payment of lawyers' fees in derivative suit cases that does exacerbate the agency
cost problem. That is, uniquely here, the lawyer can fail to recover
any monetary benefit for the corporation or ostensible plaintiff's
class at all but nonetheless be held to have conferred an intangible
substantial benefit on the corporation. You may recall from the
Mills 7 case, which was decided under the proxy rules, that by pointing out a trivial error in the proxy statement in connection with the
merger, which everyone agreed was fair, the lawyers were able to
collect hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees. This really exacerbates the conflict of interest problem. You may have an incentive to
bring the typical strike suit because even if you are not successful,
you may be able to get the managers to agree to the identification of
some substantial benefit. The other way it cuts, of course, is that
you may sacrifice the interest of your plaintiff in order to cut down
DOOLEY:

7

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).

19861

PROCEEDINGS

407

on the amount of their recovery, but you still get yourself a very
substantial benefit. To give one very dramatic example of the difference a derivative suit makes, in an injunctive action, even if it's
brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, there is no provision for
the collection of attorney's fees from the benefited class if you have
no pre-agreement with them that they are going to pay you. All you
need to do is to characterize those same operative facts as a proxy
rule violation, turn it into a derivative suit, and you will end up getting the fees paid for by the corporation.
LEUBSDORF: I don't think it's appropriate to say that we should go
back to the old percentage system, because there was no old percentage system. There were a few decisions which said judges have
to pick a percentage. There were some articles, notably by Professor
Hornstein, approving this, but there was no agreement whatsoever
as to what the percentage was supposed to be. So that it doesn't
seem to me that you have any system there: Each judge was able to
pick whatever percentage seemed appropriate in each case. I find it
hard to see in that any kind of guidance to plaintiffs' lawyers as to
which cases they should accept, or any kind of social judgment as to
which cases are to be encouraged.
Is there any reason to adopt a pure lodestar approach which
might lead to a fee substantially larger than what the corporation
recovers? That implies a social judgment that you want derivative
suits to be brought even if the corporation itself does not benefit in
the short-run. You might want to adopt such a theory if you have a
strong belief in the deterrent impact of such suits on other cases. A
percentage approach, on the other hand, tends to align the interests
of the plaintiff's lawyer with the corporation's own short-term interests. You might want to have some kind of combination of percentage and hourly rate. It requires a fair amount of detailed analysis to
figure out what the implications are for each formula as to what kind
of suits you've decided to encourage and why. No one has really
done that yet.
If you are going to have a system, that requires something else,
too, and that is some method of making sure the fees actually paid
have some connection to the formula which you've established. The
basic problem that we start out from is that most of these cases are
settled, so that the parties and not the court may fix the fee.
FiscHEL: The more basic question which I think needs to be addressed before you can get to fees is, again, what is the marginal
contribution of these private attorneys general. We need a theory
for why it is these people are needed as opposed to large shareholders. Why do you want to create any fees to compensate people for
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additional monitoring? Large shareholders have the same or
greater ability to bring the suit and the collective action problems
are, at the very least, significantly minimized. The whole premise
upon which all of these fee discussions rest, namely that there is
some need to give these people incentives to bring suits, is a very
questionable proposition.
Ken Scott once slyly recommended that we might just do
away with the requirement of having shareholder plaintiffs in these
cases altogether and let attorneys simply be designated as private
attorneys general. This idea seems to raise the problems of the derivative suit in its darkest form. Nobody in the ALI would buy that
notion. The Business Roundtable would spend $10 billion lobbying
against allowing the organized bar of the United States to have carte
blanche to bring these suits. Yet I think we could probably all agree
that that is almost exactly what we have today, except that the present scheme is a little more expensive. Let's assume the simple rule
of always allowing the attorney who is first to discover the cause of
action to proceed. Now what really is the difference between that
and what we are doing today, other than that it's cheaper? The fees
would still be set in precisely the same way. The corporation would
get precisely what it does today. We should note, however, that the
lack of the opportunity to impose a contemporaneous ownership
rule under Ken's proposal would distinguish it significantly and argue against allowing a full-fledged version of the private suits by
lawyers.
MANNE:

DOOLEY: Another reason your proposal would be so controversial is
very easy to understand, although the economists are going to have
a little difficulty with this: We lawyers despise bounty hunters as
much as we admire private attorneys general.

B.

Barriers to Suit
1. Contemporaneous Ownership Rule

The current ALI approach to contemporaneous ownership says that a holder of an equity security, which is defined as
either being common stock or a security convertible into stock,
(convertible debenture holders can be plaintiffs) has standing to
commence and maintain a derivative suit if the holder "acquired his
equity security before the earlier of the time the material facts relating to the alleged wrong were publicly disclosed or were known by
the holder"" and he continued to own the stock at the time of the
SCHWARTZ:
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suit. The theory is that you are not supposed to be able to buy a
lawsuit. Ownership may occur later than the event of which you
complain. If we are talking about the true surreptitious self-dealing
transaction that has never been disclosed publicly and is not known
by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could bring suit even if he bought shares
at a later date. Clearly, he did not buy stock so he could bring a
lawsuit. That is consistent with the rule in Pennsylvania and California, but it is not the rule anywhere else.
ScoTt: It's the victim compensation point. If you are concerned
with compensating injured parties and you see some injured parties,
then the contemporaneous stockholder rule plays a purported function in compensating only injured victims. If you're concerned with
deterrence, you're not concerned with who gets the compensation;
you're concerned with the proper incentive to maintain the lawsuit.
2.

Security for Expenses

The security for expenses is trivial. It was a device invented in New York in 1940-42 to check the number of stockholders' derivative suits. Under the law in New York, which provided the
model for this, if the suit was filed by a person who owned less than
five percent of the stock of the company, he could be ordered to
post a bond as security for expenses of the defendants. The bond
would be in an amount determined by the court. It would be expensive to furnish the bond, but, worse, you might have to actually pay
on it. That mode of statute was followed by several other states.
New Jersey had it, California had a variation of it. It was widespread. It was predicted by one legal scholar as the deathknell of
the stockholder derivative suit. Like Mark Twain's obituary, this one
was quite premature for several reasons. One is that many suits
were filed as violations of the federal securities laws along with a
state law count. One could not impose the security for expense requirement on suits filed under the federal securities laws. The other
thing is you would ask the company for a stockholders list and then
try to solicit other persons to join you with the suit to get up above
the five percent level. In practice, it has not been a significant device. One measure of its significance is Delaware never adopted any
such requirement for suits filed in a Delaware court. The Model Business CorporationAct recently, in its 1984 revision of the statute, abandoned the requirement of security for expenses. I think at this point
it has become an unimportant requirement.
SCHWARTZ:

My response to what Don just said is that while I agree with
his use of the adjective "trivial," I'm not sure that that is always the
same thing as "uninteresting." What's interesting about security for
MACEY:
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expense statutes is their attempt to impose a nontrivial roadblock on
the initiation of derivative suits. This is interesting in spite of the
fact that, ultimately, the roadblock was successfully circumvented
and did become trivial.
If it really were trivial, I'm not so sure that much energy
would have been spent on reversing it. I think it did have an effect,
and it was there for a very important reason. There is a much
higher likelihood of so called "strike suits" from small shareholders,
who can't suffer much of the cost but who may experience a lot of
the gain, than from a holder of a large number of shares. The approach is perfectly sensible, and to get around it costs money. It is
not costless to find a nominal plaintiff, and it is not costless if you
preferred being in state court without a federal count. I think the
principle underlying it was perfectly correct. Now, I don't know
whether it is trivial or not, but I don't think you do either.
MANNE:

There was one study of it made in 1968 in a journal
published by Columbia Law School, after a twenty-three year experience, that indicated that it had not had the intended effect.
SCHWARTZ:

ScoTrr: The bond aspect was not all that important, but the different
rule that losing plaintiffs paid the defendants' legal fees does, indeed, change the incentives of plaintiffs' attorneys. The problem
with saying that the bond is the correct principle is that it changes
the incentives for plaintiffs' attorney without any dependence or reference whatever to the merits of the lawsuit.
No, that is not true. Statistically it must be true that a
higher percentage of cases brought by large shareholders will be
sustained on the merits than those brought by small shareholders.
MANNE:

Shareholdings are not immutuable. If you believed in the
entrepreneurial theory of the plaintiff's attorney, they could act very
much like control bearers and aggregate shares if they really felt
they could increase the value of the firm by their actions.
FIsCHEL:

ScoTT: That would make a difference in New York, for example, but
not under the California rule, which does not turn on the size of the
plaintiff's shareholding.
The point is that if, as suspected, at least in publicly held
corporations, there is an inverse correlation between size of shareholdings and who the plaintiff is, then I think that that is very valuable information as to the value of these types of suits. The issue is
getting people to bring suit who have the right incentives or better
FISCHEL:
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incentives. In that sense, I think rather than dispensing with some
of these requirements, you can make a good argument for strengthening them-making it harder to get around the security for expense statute for example. The initial purpose of the security for
expense statute seems to me to be a very sensible one.
ScoTt: Yes, but you can't keep entangling two subjects and clearly
analyze either of them. There are incentives, and there are reasons
to think about the way our litigation system works in general. The
loser-pays-expenses rule is a thing to think about in the operation of
our legal system in general. Those issues do not pertain solely to
the stockholder derivative suit or the issue of corporate liability
rules. If you want to deal with the functioning or malfunctioning of
the litigation system in general, that's a perfectly appropriate topic,
but it is extraneous to a consideration of the function of liability
rules in the relationship between the shareholder and the
management.
FIsCHEL: I do think there is a difference, but I don't think that they
are unrelated the way you have said. The point that we make in our
paper is that there are worse incentives on which to sue when you
are a small shareholder of a large corporation than there are in
other litigation contexts, particularly when the beneficiaries of the
suit are other shareholders who frequently will have a larger stake in
the venture. Because the ability of somebody with a smaller stake in
the venture is so contrary to the one-share, one-vote rule, which is
the basic decision-making rule of corporations, there is an argument
for having a security for expenses statute in this context regardless
of whether the English rule or the American rule is a desirable rule
in other contexts. So, therefore, while you are right that the question of the English or the American rule raises an issue that is larger
than the derivative suit context, I think it is wrong to suggest that
there is no relationship between the ability of somebody with one
share to sue and the particular kinds of constraints that you might
want to place on that individual, even if you don't place constraints
on other individuals in other types of lawsuits in the economy.
3.

Demand and Termination

On demand, the law for suits that are brought in federal
court and the law that applies to suits that are brought in almost
every other court as well requires that before the suit can begin, the
plaintiff has to plead that he made a demand on the directors that
the suit be brought or to explain that he didn't make a demand because to make such a demand would have been a futility. For example, if a board consisted of five people, all of whom are engaged in
SCHWARTZ:
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the same self-dealing transaction with the corporation, it's a waste of
time to ask them to have the corporation bring suit against themselves. About two states also provide that demand must be made on
shareholders.
The demand on directors used to be regarded as a fairly formalistic thing. A lot of people didn't want to bring the demand because
they wanted to file in a real hurry before twenty other people filed
the same lawsuit. There were certain economic advantages to the
lawyer who was the first in the court room. But if you didn't make a
demand when you should have, the court would send you back to
make a demand, and there wouldn't be a whole lot lost.
The demand requirement now has very special significance because what will often happen is that after the suit is filed the board
of directors will form a special litigation committee, hopefully to
consist of three people who are not parties to the lawsuit. Indeed, if
they are lucky, they are three persons who have joined the board of
directors since the transaction in question, so that they can't be
tainted in any way with having been interested in the transaction.
The special committee may appoint outside counsel, may conduct
some kind of investigation, may take some evidence, and will come
up with a report. If the report recommends that the suit be terminated, then the corporation or the defendants will move to dismiss
the lawsuit on grounds that the board has acted to terminate the
lawsuit.
In New York, in a case called Auerbach v. Bennett,9 the court said
there were only two things they would inquire into: Was the committee independent? Did it function in an independent manner? If
the answer to both of those questions was yes, the court says there is
no further interest in this on the part of the court. The committee
has acted to protect the interest of the corporation; the suit is
terminated.
Delaware, in a case called Zapata v. Maldonado1 0 said, in a case in
which plaintiff didn't have to make a demand because of the futility
of making the demand, the court would not necessarily accept the
view of the committee as final; the court would exercise its discretion to examine the substance of the decision and indeed might allow discovery on the part of the plaintiff to prove that it was not in
the interest of the corporation to terminate the lawsuit. If, on the
other hand, the suit was one in which demand was required, the
board's judgment is final if it met the standards of the business judgment rule, which meant the court basically wouldn't second guess
9
10

47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
Zapata Corp.v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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what the committee did. The issue under Delaware law therefore
comes down, to a large extent, on the question of whether demand
is required. There has been a lot of law that has developed in the
last couple of years under Delaware law as to when demand is required and when it is futile. But this is, indeed, a serious constraint
on the ability of plaintiffs to conduct derivative suits.
I think that the law should move toward depriving defendants
of the ability to decide whether the case against them should proceed. I think that Delaware made an essentially sound decision in
Zapata v. Maldonado which gave the courts the opportunity to review
the decision of the special litigation committee and, of considerable
importance, allowed for discovery on the plaintiffs part so that they
could find out if there was more there than they were aware of from
the documents that were filed. That's been undercut by the Aronson"I case, which imposed, I think, an unreasonable standard in connection with when demand would be required. It was a suit against
a forty-seven percent shareholder of the company for self-dealing,
and the court said that demand was not rendered futile by the fact
that it was a suit against what would seem to be the controlling person of the company.
FISCHEL: Instead of hearing what judges think about whether proce-

dures are fair, I want to know whether the large shareholders think
the procedures are fair. They are the people who are really going to
get the benefit or bear the costs of the procedures. Information
costs are positive, and therefore it might not be cost efficient to prepare this report. It's very interesting to know what the institutional
investors think.
MANNE: These are extraordinarily expensive forms of litigation.
The litigation cost is on average double what the same ultimate result would cost in any other context because, in effect, the judge has
to try the matter twice. He has to decide first whether there's a
higher likelihood that he's going to find for the plaintiff in the case.
If so, then you have a case to litigate. Indeed, I'll bet in some cases
the first finding is more complicated than the second.
RIBSTEIN: I wanted to qualify a little bit of what Don said. I don't

think, under my reading of current Delaware cases, that the demand
on directors is all that significant for a number of reasons. In the
first place, there are a couple of recent Chancery Court decisions
that say that even where the plaintiff made a demand and was refused, and this is consistent with the language of Zapata, the court
11

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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will still look at whether demand was required. In other words,
whether the plaintiff made a demand in the first place isn't the significant point; the question is whether demand was required. It's
true that the Aronson test makes it more difficult to sue when it is a
demand-required situation. However, the way Aronson's been interpreted, you just have to add more allegations. The court is going to
look only at the allegations, rather than beyond the pleadings. Finally, there is some indication in the recent Kaplan12 case that even
in a situation where demand is not required, the court is not going
to exercise independent business judgment except in egregious
cases. This was predicted by some people at the time of Zapata.
The bottom line is that I don't think the demand on directors is all
that important right now.
C.

Assessment of Litigation Costs

Plaintiff's attorney is paid out of what would otherwise go
to the corporation. On the other hand, we don't have any rule that
penalizes the attorney in case the suit is lost. It may be worth looking into the question of whether some penalties would be appropriate, such as the rule in federal courts allowing judges to levy
penalties on lawyers in cases where they find there is a frivolous
prosecution or, more generally, the English rule on assessment of
costs against the losing party.
MANNE:

GOETZ: In the normal situation of contingency fee cases, at least the
putative beneficiary has a positive expected value from the case. In
this situation, some small subset-as small as one-has a positive
expected value, but the majority may not. Therefore, my conclusion
is that I am generally sympathetic toward changing to the English
rule if we possibly could.
The English rule avoids another problem with respect to the
remedies we now have for abuse of process or bringing a frivolous
claim. I wanted to put on my economist hat and tell all of you lawyers that I am not at all sure what, in the formal sense, an abusive or
frivolous claim is. It does not seem to me that it is a claim, for instance, that only has a one percent chance of winning. There are
lots of instances in which such a claim is socially beneficial if it's
brought. Therefore, I'm not sure what it does mean, but it puts an
enormous burden upon a court to separate frivolous claims and
abuse of process from other kinds of claims.
LEUBSDORF:

Henry's reference to the English rule suggests that it

12 Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A. 2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), afd, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,345 (Oct 9, 1985).
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should be imported to our legal system. I disagree. If these suits
are to be brought at all, obviously no individual shareholder has the
interest to bring them because he will get only a small slice of the
recovery. Therefore, you have to collect in some way from all those
who are benefited or from the corporation. I don't see how you can
then say that if the plaintiff loses, he, or more likely his lawyer, has
to pay the whole cost of the defense. The message you then send to
the plaintiff's lawyer is that she should never take any of these cases
unless there is a very, very high probability of winning or, alternatively, the expected fee is so huge that it dwarfs the possibility of
having to pay the other side's fees.
D.

Settlement

I think one has to regard the provisions requiring delay
of negotiation of attorneys' fees provisions until after the settlement
has been approved by the court as a way of dealing, among other
problems, with the special problem in this area that Professor Coffee has explored: There is interest on both sides in pushing the
costs off onto the corporation itself. In a way the proposed rule is,
in the short run, bad, perhaps for corporations, and certainly for
defendants. Once the suit has been brought, obviously it's to your
advantage to settle it as soon as possible, particularly if you are the
defendant. On the other hand, in the long run, it may be to your
benefit as a potential defendant that you will not be able to buy off
the plaintiff as easily as was done before. This measure does have
some impact at least in avoiding the situation where a weak suit is
brought simply so the plaintiff's attorney's fees will get paid off.
LEUBSDORF:

CARNEY: This is not dissimilar from the greenmail problem which,

in a sense, is kind of an extortion problem for managers. One solution that's being developed is a contract solution: Amend the articles or the bylaws of the corporation to prohibit greenmail, and
announce that the officers of the company lack the power and ability
to pay that kind of greenmail. I don't see anybody writing that kind
of contract concerning derivative suit settlement into a corporate
charter, which leads me to believe that we are not really talking
about a very serious problem here.
There are various possibilities. You might reinvigorate
the corporation itself as an objector. You might have the court appoint someone. Maybe the Business Roundtable should constitute
itself the guardian of the fee standards as I believe they did in the
LEUBSDORF:
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Fine Paper litigation. 13 The approach of the proposed guidelines, I
think, goes partway in that direction by saying no negotiation on
fees can occur before the settlement is approved by the court.
Bill said, if preventing collusive settlements is a good proposal,
why is it not written into corporate bylaws? There's probably no
complete answer, but one thing, at least, occurs to me, and that is
that the people who settle are the officers, so they would be the ones
who would have to enter into contracts never to settle any derivative
suits against themselves. Now you could, of course, write into the
corporate bylaws a provision that indemnity would never be available to someone who settled the case, and that would certainly deal
with that problem. On the other hand, if you think there is a need
for a derivative suit in the first place, I think you would have some
skepticism that the directors would get together and write a corporate bylaw that says we will never indemnify ourselves, unless we
actually go to trial and win.
Bill, I think that the reason no corporation through its
officers and directors would adopt a provision like the one you are
suggesting, a rule that would say that no derivative suit may be settled, that they all must be litigated, is that the officers and directors
wouldn't dare do that for fear that under state law they could not get
indemnification if they went to trial and they lost. State law right
now prohibits them from being indemnified. You could change
state law, but that would have to be a necessary complement to your
suggestion.
SCHWARTZ:

Part of the response to Don's comments is that the provisions authorizing liability insurance coverage are broader than those
for indemnification in a number of respects. You don't preclude entirely protecting managers, even when they lose on the merits of
litigation, if you've got liability insurance. The other part of the
answer, it seems to me, is that managers still have incentives to reduce the firm's cost. One form of those costs is extortion costs, if
that's what we're talking about here, in terms of frivolous derivative
actions. If this were a serious problem, it seems to me that managers would do that to reduce the cost of capital to the firm.
CARNEY:

SCHWARTZ:

MANNE:

Not when it's out of their pocket. That's the problem.

They can't know that ex ante.

SCHWARTZ:

No. Well, there is still a personal risk that they will be

13 In Re Fine Paper Anti-Trust Litigation, 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), afd in part,
751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
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found liable. Indeed, there's a risk that you would be found liable
even when you haven't done anything wrong. Managers therefore
would not want to foreclose as a firm rule the opportunity to settle
litigation for which they would stand a greater likelihood of being
both insured and indemnified.
CARNEY: Even to the extent that the corporation is precluded from
buying certain kinds of insurance, the manager is not. If you think
of yourself as an honest person, you are not much worried about
these moral hazards insurers won't deal with, which are mostly fraud
and self-dealing problems.
SCHWARTZ:

Even if they can buy their own insurance policy, it's very

costly.
But it's not costly if that's a cost of hiring managers for the
firm. It will be incorporated into their other compensation.
CARNEY:

VI
RELATED AREAS

A.

Closely-Held Corporations

Many of these problems take on a different hue and probably involve different values as Harold Demsetz's work would certainly suggest, when we're talking about close corporations. There
are two aspects to that. One is that the substantive approach might
vary. The other is the question of whether there should be more
statutory enabling provisions in one type of corporation than in the
other. Would anyone care to make comments on the difference between the typical publicly-held corporation case that we've been
talking about and one with, say, three, four, or five shareholders?
MANNE:

I'll simply repeat what you have always said. They should
have, and in practice do have, a different corporation law. They
should permit all sorts of special litigation.
TULLOCK:

How much difference in fact is there in the case law on derivative suits?
MANNE:

I believe there are cases supporting a different treatment,
in terms of permitting shareholders in close corporations to make
an end run around the board more readily, among other things, because they have a more real interest involved.
RIBSTEIN:

Certainly, you are not dealing with the same level of collective goods, free riders, etc. problems in close corporations. But
MANNE:
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where does that lead us? I presume towards allowing the suits to be
brought more readily.
DOOLEY: With respect to the closely-held corporation, the major
problem is illiquidity. John and I have found that the majority of
litigation in the close corporation area is likely to be in connection
with suits for involuntary dissolution, where the minority is simply
trying to get out.
The most difficult situation develops sometimes in a
second generation of what started as a family business, or a two family business, and you've got one dominant family perhaps owning
slightly more stock than the other where one family is deriving an
income from the business and now has opportunities to deal unfairly with the minority shareholders. Or maybe the majority will
deprive the minority of employment in the company, and then they
have no place to go. Either they don't have a buyout agreement or
they don't have one that covers every conceivable contingency.
Maybe that was a conscious choice for good reason. They are kind
of stuck with the situation. Maybe the majority is paying themselves
excessive salaries, self-dealing, the kinds of things which in a public
corporation would clearly be the basis of a derivative suit leading to
corporate recovery. But corporate recovery seems strangely out of
place in this situation. It's the individual recovery that is appropriate. There is a host of remedies that are appropriate in the close
corporation situation that would not be appropriate in the public
company situation: Dissolution of the corporation at one extreme,
buying out the stock at some value to be determined because the
value of the stock isn't self evident in those cases, perhaps injunction, perhaps damages. But the award probably ought to go to the
minority shareholder directly at this point rather than to the corporation. There are even a few cases in public corporations where corporate recovery in a case where there was injury to the corporation
has nonetheless gone to the individual shareholders rather than to
the corporation itself. Perlman v. Feldman14 is a leading case in this
area where the recovery that the court decided was appropriate was
given directly to the individual shareholders in order to avoid a
windfall gain to the wrongdoers who owned about thirty-five percent of the stock of the company.
SCHWARTZ:

The small shareholder's ability to contract in a close corporation is far greater than in a publicly-held corporation.
WOLFSON:

14

219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
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With respect to whether we need fiduciary duties in close
corporations in light of the fact that shareholders can contract, you
have the problem of anticipating problems over time. The kind of
agreement that Nick was referring to would be made at the outset of
the corporation. It's very difficult to project a few years down the
line what kinds of problems are going to arise. Maybe you do need
the kind of implied contract that fiduciary duties provide.
RIBSTEIN:

With respect to Nick Wolfson's comment that it is easier
to contract in close corporations, I used to believe that, but I'm less
convinced that it's true now.
In close corporations the minority protects itself from overreaching through various sets of super-majority voting rules, class
voting on various transactions, a whole variety of things, to constrain the majority. We are beginning to see some of those same
devices in public corporations in shark repellents that are designed
to limit the power of the dominant stockholder who comes in during
a takeover, voting rules for takeout transactions being the most obvious. Beyond that, fair price requirements contain a whole set of
prohibitions against self-dealing.
CARNEY:

GOETZ: Endorsing in a kind of general way the distinction that we
are making here between the closely-held and the dispersed ownership corporation, I want to express my nervousness about it. It's
similar in lots of ways to the distinction between the so-called large
numbers case and the small numbers case in public goods theory
and between concentrated and decentralized industries. The operative question about which I am very nervous is how small do the
numbers have to be and how closely-held does the corporation have
to be to make a real difference? If this were a cartel, or a public
goods problem, we would say that even so few as four or five or six
people exercising common ownership rights creates a substantial
number of questions. Indeed, I often argue to my students that between two and three you get a difference of kind rather than degree.
After that, it's mostly degree. I have this kind of nervousness about
closely held corporations as well.
I'm not sure exactly how you would define a closely-held
corporation. There are two aspects in which there is a problem.
Obviously there's going to be some kind of quantitative continuous
variable that deals with the fraction of shares that's owned by a few
shareholders. One problem is where to draw the line. More interesting than this is that a corporation that you would call a publiclyheld corporation can, for a period of time, satisfy the quantitative
definition of a closely-held corporation, as when a takeover takes
DEMSETZ:
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place. When a takeover takes place, one person gathers in a great
fraction of the shares. Does this company then qualify, for that period of time, for a separate body of legal doctrine? Even in some
very large corporations, a dominant shareholder has fifty-percent of
the stock in a few cases. Why should we let the minority shareholder bring a suit if we wouldn't in a closely-held corporation?
Offhand, I can see very little reason to treat it differently
CARNEY:
from a close corporation. At that point there are no duty of care
cases to worry about. Where you have a dominant stockholder with
a major block of shares, it's too large an interest to let serious negligence occur. Duty of loyalty cases are not cases of the manager
stealing as much as they are disputes among co-investors about the
terms of a transaction that's likely to take place-takeout mergers
and that sort of thing. It seems to me that it's really a class action if
there's any kind of an action at all among shareholders.
Even if you can identify differences between the two entities, I think the problems are exactly the same, in the sense that the
use of liability rules in litigation as a monitoring device is simply one
of many monitoring devices, including explicit contract and the precise role of one versus the others. It's fine to say you can't anticipate
every contingency. But that doesn't mean that a court is going to
come in all-knowingly when a contingency comes up and reach the
right answer. That's the problem with liberal fiduciary duties. It's
true, you can tell the story about illiquidity and exploitation, you can
use that as justification for liberal fiduciary duties or easy dissolution. The problem is the costs of making it easy to sue. You still
have problems of strategic behavior. The rule of strict fiduciary
duty makes it hard to pay people different things, even though their
marginal contribution to the firm might be extremely different. That
encourages people to free ride on the efforts of others and demand
equal compensation. Easy dissolution has other types of problems
in terms of forcing firms to be sold to some of the current investors
or somebody else. So I don't think a priori you can say whether
liability rules are more important or less important in close
corporations.
FISCHEL:

Let me suggest a reason for the difference. A close corporation is one in which you do care who the other members are.
You find that problem occurring whether it be a large number or
small number.
There's a teamwork here, whether it be small or large, and
that's what you are worried about. Examples are country clubs,
where you don't let the guy just sell out, but make him sell back to
ALCHIAN:
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the company and then they sell to somebody else of their choice.
For that kind of enterprise, would you want different sets of rules
about liability? In my conjecture, you might.
WOLFSON: There's another aspect to the close corporation which
was observed some years ago. The problem is when the parties fall
out in these deals, it becomes so much more difficult to meaningfully enforce the agreements they've worked out. People who
worked together can no longer work together, even though that was
their agreement. So you really want easy dissolution and dollars
rather than specific enforcement of the agreement.
It seems to me that one significant difference is that in a
public corporation, we've got investors with rational expectations,
we've got market pressures to write the correct kinds of contracts, to
reduce agency costs, and perhaps to reduce conflict among co-investors. You reach a level where the market no longer imposes that
kind of constraint on the organizers of the firm. You are also talking
about a different level of scale problems in writing an elaborate contract. There are economics of the large corporation with lots of investors that don't exist when you have the three person corporation
trying to write the contract to anticipate an equal number of contingencies. So you've got scale problems, you've got bounded rationality problems and lack of a market to set the bounds of the contract.
Maybe that's the functional way to look at what is a close corporation and what is a public corporation. It's very different from the
way lawyers tend to look at it.
CARNEY:

B.

Direct Class and Injunction Actions

Shareholder litigation sometimes takes the form of class
action and not derivative suits. Some of the corporate law rules that
tilt against the effective use of derivative suits don't operate at all
when it comes to class actions, so that the special litigation committee, for example, is a device unknown to preventing class actions
from proceeding. There are some very important cases in the corporate law area that are class actions. One that comes up for discussion and is even mentioned in the Fischel-Bradley paper is Smith v.
Van Gorkom,15 a recent Delaware case in which the business judgment rule was rejected in application to a particular merger. The
case is asserted as a class action, and no special litigation committee
could have operated to prevent it.
SCHWARTZ:

LEFrwiCH:
15

I'd like to confess my ignorance in asking a clarifying

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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question. Why is it when somebody wants to bring a suit they
choose a derivative suit rather than a class action suit?
There are some types of claims that can only be brought
as derivative suits and some that can only be brought as class actions. The search is to see who the injured party is. Let's take one
self-dealing transaction, excess compensation. That suit claims that
the corporation wasted assets, that it paid too much. Therefore, the
injured party directly is the corporation. Indirectly, investors may
have suffered injury because the value of their stock was diminished,
but that suit may only be brought as a derivative suit. By contrast,
let's assume that the suit alleges that the managers refused to pay
dividends when they should have paid dividends. The injury is directly to the individual shareholder. That suit may be brought as a
direct action. The ultimate question in most of these cases is to seek
to whom the recovery would go. If the recovery would go to the
corporation, the suit must be asserted as a derivative action. If the
recovery would go to the individuals, theii it may be brought as a
direct action.
SCHWARTZ:

I just wanted to say that we focused on derivative suits
because much of the commentary in corporate law focused on derivative suits, but there is nothing unique in our paper to derivative
suits. Most of the concepts would apply equally well to class actions.
FISCHEL:

Don Schwartz's summary of the law I think was somewhat
of an oversimplification or at least gave some form where maybe
there isn't. There is a recent case, for instance, Moran v. Household
International,Inc., 16 in which the court characterized as a derivative
suit something that I think there would be a great deal of agreement
was really a direct action. I think that the distinction should probably be made along policy lines. In other words, what are the
problems that affect derivative suits that don't affect direct suits?
Dan Fischel said a while ago that a lot of what he had to say affected
both, in which case maybe if we're talking about prescribing rules
here, we're talking about going across the board. I happen to think
that the distinctions rise to a sufficient level of importance that there
ought to be a difference in treatment.
RIBSTEIN:

Is there a different rule for compensating attorneys in direct and derivative suits?
MANNE:

Scorr: They still talk lodestar, they still pay attention to size of
16

490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), afd, No. 37, 1985, slip op. (Del. Nov. 19, 1985).
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recovery, and they're still conceptually confused about exactly what
they are up to.
DOOLEY: Can you end up with no monetary recovery and the payment of attorney's fees?
ScoTr: That also can happen in the class action. You can bring a
class action for injunctive relief.
DOOLEY: You can't get your attorney's fees except under a statute,
Ken.
LEUBSDORF:

You can under some circumstances, the leading case

being Hall v. Cole, 17 a suit to require the restoration of democratic
procedures in a union. The doctrine is the same one as in the Mills
case, the common benefit case. In Hall the union members are
thought to benefit and they will wind up paying the fee assessed
against the union because they pay union dues. If you brought a
suit for injunctive relief and you could not as in Hall pass the costs
on to those who benefit, then you wouldn't be able to recover attorney's fees unless there was a statute. Actually, that is one of the
areas where attorney's fee statutes have been passed most prolifically. For instance, in civil rights suits for injunctive relief or damages, it is the defendant who pays and not a third party or the
plaintiff.
CARNEY: In derivative actions that are not for damages but for in-

junctive relief we are moving from rules of liability to property rules.
This has always troubled me considerably. When we start talking
about injunctive relief, we are talking about stopping a transaction
some regular corporate procedure has approved, whether it's a
shareholder vote or a director vote or simply a routine action of an
officer who has the regular power to do certain things. In the context of corporate mergers, for example, one minority shareholder
says it's unfair to me after a transaction has taken place.
It's not that he doesn't like the deal. They are not willing
to give back the premium. They want to keep the premium and get
more. It's a costless option. Nobody's saying, "I want to undo
this." It's "give back the premium."
FISCHEL:

CARNEY: Injunction suits are simply the holdout case where the

holdout stockholder is trying to impose a rule of unanimous consent
on the corporate body, for which I find no justification at all.
17

412 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Duties to Bondholders

When you look at bondholder covenants, what you'll find
is that although they are explicit, they, too, are limited in what they
constrain and what they monitor. For example, there are no covenants that say you should take on all positive net present value
projects or reject all negatives, but rather it has to do with observables. There's never a bond covenant that says you can't pay dividends, but rather you can pay dividends out of a pool of funds, and
things like that.
BRADLEY:

Maybe the difference between the shareholder contract
and the bondholder contract is explained by the fact that the shareholders dop't care about these specific duties. All they care about is
that they're getting a decent return.
RIBSTEIN:

I think that there is something of a conceptual confusion
there. If stealing could be reduced at a cosl of zero, then there's no
rational explanation of why equity holders, regardless of what their
expected rate of return was, wouldn't want to do it. I think the
problem, in both the debt holder and the equity holder cases, but in
different ways, is that it is impossible, beyond a certain point, to reduce the cost of stealing without creating even greater costs by the
prevention measures that you are undertaking. A contract which
attempted to minimize self-dealing by precluding wide categories of
director action would probably reduce the level of self-dealing, but
the amount of beneficial conduct you would wipe out at the same
time would make it an inefficient contract to write, which is why you
don't observe it. I don't think it's so much a matter that people
don't care about stealing, it's just they'll only try to prevent it up to
the point of where the costs of prevention are less than the expected
benefits from the reduced self-dealing.
FISCHEL:

The bondholder engages in a true bargaining situation
through the underwriter who markets these bonds, because the underwriter puts himself in the position of his customers who will
purchase these bonds and will negotiate the terms of the trust indenture in an actual, hard contested bargaining situation. The
bondholder is indifferent to stealing and to shirking for several reasons. Shirking affects the shareholders. Stealing, for the most part,
will affect the shareholders. So long as the bondholder is paid his
interest and principal when due, he doesn't care whether the company maximizes profits or not. And, he has a much more effective
remedy than the shareholder does, if, for one reason or another, the
interest isn't paid, which is that he can foreclose on the bond. If he
has collateral, he can protect himself through the collateral. If he
SCHWARTZ:
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doesn't have collateral he can, perhaps, cause the company to go
into bankruptcy by making the entire bond due immediately. That's
a far more effective remedy than anything that the shareholder has
for stealing or for the effects of shirking.
ALCHIAN: I wish you were right, Don, but you're not. It isn't true

that when the equity or the stock price of firms goes down the bondholders aren't affected too. It's true that the bondholder has the first
claim, but the size of the residual is not irrelevant.
DOOLEY: The reason you see this kind of contracting on behalf of
bondholders and not shareholders is that, in some sense, bondholders face a higher risk. That sense is as follows: Management has an
interest in working in the best interest of the shareholders, but not
the bondholders, once the money is borrowed. That does not indicate that this kind of financial covenanting is not costly-indeed, it
demonstrates that it is costly, and this is one of the ways in which
bondholders try to reduce the risk to which they would otherwise be
subject. Otherwise, as soon as the loan was made, management has
an incentive to put off as much uncompensated risk on the bondholders as possible.
GOETZ: People who are attempting to write these opting out contracts rely on broad duties on the one hand and, on the other, try to
articulate in detail exactly what it is they want the trustees or the
directors to do. You have a lot of illustrations in these kinds of relationships of reliance being placed upon a broad and somewhat
ephemeral duty of care, duty to use best efforts or whatever. Dan
and Mike referred to these types of problems in regard to describing
the alternatives in their paper. If you begin to lay out in detail exactly what you want the trustee or the director to do for you, you'd
better do a darn good job of it. Otherwise you get into the difficulties of courts not knowing whether you are simply articulating some
of the things that come within the purview of the broad duty or
whether you are cutting back on the broad duty. Bob Scott and I
describe this in a recent contracts article 18 as the difficulty of the
court knowing whether the detailed specifications are "trumps" of
the original relationship, which actually change it, or whether they
are "supplements" where the parties simply spin out in more detail
what they want.
a fundamental problem in a very detailed specification of obligations. The more detailed specifications are, the
DEMSETZ: There is

18 Goetz and Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985).
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more the specifier is actually doing the managing. If you hire somebody to do the managing, you have to leave him with a significant
degree of freedom. That's what the art of managing requires. So
even if it were technically possible, you wouldn't want to specify
everything in detail. You might as well not hire the manager to begin with.

